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This paper reviews research on the effects of the UK regulatory model on 
competition, consumers, investment and innovation, with a particular 
focus on energy, telecommunications and water sectors. Overall, the 
regulatory model has largely delivered its initial economic objectives.  
 
The paper is not a simple summary of the literature, but an analytical 
review that integrates the research findings into a concise whole. While 
not purporting to be primary research, this synthesis does provide some 
thoughts about areas in which current information seems inadequate or 
there is particular merit in new or ongoing research. This review is 
particularly relevant at a time when the role and effectiveness of 
regulators are being questioned in multiple domains. Maintaining a 
strong focus on the economic performance of regulated sectors remains 





This paper can be seen in the context of a broader debate on the objectives 
of regulation, notably related to vulnerability, fairness and achieving 
major system change, which were not the initial legislated economic 
objectives of the regulatory model. 
 
This synthesis fits into a key part of a broader discussion that is 
particularly intense in the UK, about whether the regulatory goals are 
themselves appropriate and whether government should reorient the 
focus of regulators. This broader debate includes questions about 
vulnerable consumers and fairness, about how to ensure that political 
objectives are met by the regulators and about how systems that are 
operational for periods of incremental change may work less well when 
dramatic changes need navigating. These questions are political and 
beyond the scope of this review. They do, however, reinforce the 
distinction between the role of legislative government, to establish 
parameters of action for regulators, with governments providing 
occasional steers to regulators, and the consequent role of independent 





International evidence seems to suggest the UK model has performed 
relatively well, often being perceived as a leader. 
 
A number of key points emerge from this review. The first is that, despite 
substantial domestic questioning of parts of the existing UK model, the 
limited number of international comparisons of regulatory quality suggest 
the UK is a regulatory leader in the domains under study, both in terms of 
quality perception and various aspects of practice. This results in a 
seeming dissonance between international comparisons and domestic 
views among some quarters that regulation needs substantial alteration. 
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Further exploring the reasons for this gap seems important. This 
exploration should involve further and up-to-date comparative work, that 
could include detailed, sub-national and comparable data from multiple 




Active competition has proven a particularly strong driver of consumer 
and productivity benefits, often with regulatory support. 
 
One major finding, with substantial support, is that active competition has 
been a key driver of consumer and productivity benefits in the energy and 
telecommunications arenas. Some authors suggest that the change in 
ownership arising from privatisation was not, in and of itself, a major 
driver of consumer benefits, instead the preparation to make an industry 
ready for privatisation, in many ways, achieved an initial productivity 
boost, and this was followed by subsequent regulation which created the 







Investment and innovation have occurred at substantial levels, though 
there may be an increasing frequency with which large investments are 
undertaken at government behest that are not valued at their cost by 
customers. 
 
The UK regulatory model has been successful in ensuring that substantial 
investments have been made in the energy, telecommunications and 
water sectors. Such investment were a key objective of the new system 
when it was established.  There is a risk of high cost investments not being 
valued as much by the customer as they cost. Where feasible, effort has 
been made to maintain technologically neutral approaches. The move 
away from political and regulatory neutrality concerning technology 
choice to the picking of winning technologies, if made, best occurs only 
after careful and detailed consideration, particularly when costs and 
capacities of technological possibilities in the medium-term are unknown. 
There is merit in an increased focus on the relative cost-benefit levels for 
different types of consumers resulting from political and regulatory 





Consumer benefits include improved quality of supply (sometimes 
associated with increased investment), often lower prices (especially when 
adjusted for government policies and movements in world wholesale 
commodity prices) and reduced state subsidies. 
 
Consumer benefits have various dimensions, including quality of supply 
(partly associated with the level of investment), lower prices and lower 
state subsidies to previously nationalised industries.  Those papers which 
deal with quality of supply support the proposition that this has increased 
(showing, for example, that quality-adjusted price reductions have been 
greater than unadjusted reductions).  Several of the studies which focus 
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on price effects relate to the early post-privatisation period - complicated 
by the government's desire to enhance flotation prices, as well as by, in 
the water industry for example, the need for substantial post-
privatisation investment. 
 
Since then, the picture is mixed but tends to show prices falling when 
competition or regulatory action has been forthcoming.  Periodic reviews 
have tended to reduce prices for monopoly activities in all the regulated 
industries and competition has tended to reduce the prices of contestable 
activities.  However, some prices have also risen as a result of increases in 
world wholesale commodity prices (as with energy) and as a result of 
government 'policy costs' (as also notably with energy).  Most recently, 
there have been the claims (as by Citizens Advice) that consumer prices 
are higher than needed through mis-estimation of various parameters 




The focus on how to promote benefits for sub-groups of customers, 
particularly those who are not active in the market, sees different views 
over whether government and regulatory response is needed, particularly 
as “waterbed” effects may mean that when one group benefits, another 
loses. 
 
Behavioural research findings suggesting market failings may lead to 
desires and plans for intervention to benefit consumers suffering ‘harm’. 
However, more attention may need to be given to the balance between 
the winners and losers from interventions, through waterbed effects; 
lowering prices at one point in a system may lead to increases in prices at 
another point in the system. Moreover, the focus on sub-groups who are 
not active in the market raises the question of whether a regulatory 
response is needed. Commentators disagree, with Citizens Advice 
suggesting intervention is needed, while Littlechild suggests it is not. In 
the future, if more attention is paid to the impacts of regulation on sub-
groups of the population (e.g. different income groups, different 
geographic areas), governing principles will be valuable to avoid constant 
regulatory responses to help one group that, through waterbed effects, 





Going forward, particular research focus is merited on cost-benefit 
analysis of government and regulatory initiatives, and how to address and 
benefit from digitalisation in regulation. 
 
In some areas of policy, the extent of cost-benefit analysis performed for 
investments is increasingly weak. Often such analysis is not the 
responsibility of regulators and is carried out by government. Without 
robust cost-benefit analysis the costs of political decisions are arguably 
hidden or simply not calculated. The focus on financial transparency of 
decision making, that arose around the time of privatisation, and which 




Digitalisation is creating new and uncertain impacts. In the future, more 
attention would be valuable on the implications and needs of sector 
regulation with respect to these developments, as well as how 







This section describes the parameters of this literature review, the broader context in 
which it has been carried out and the structure of the review into two parts: a short synthesis 
document (the Synthesis) and the appendix that includes summaries of selected papers from 
the review (the Appendix). The subsequent three sections will (1) describe the methodology 
used, (2) summarise the key results and (3) describe potential areas for future research. 
The UK’s current model of independent economic regulation was created in the 
context of privatisation, with some regulators created in the same legislative bills that 
organised the privatisation. More than 30 years after the first privatisations, it is worth 
stepping back to review developments since then. The purpose of this synthesis is to bring 
together points found in a detailed literature review, with a particular focus on the impacts 
of the UK regulatory model for energy, telecommunications and water/sewerage. This 
synthesis is therefore not intended as primary research and the purpose is to report findings 
of existing research in a way that might be useful to the debate. The authors hope that such 
a synthesis will nonetheless add value, in particular because relatively little effort has been 
made, up until now, to assemble the many detailed findings into a qualitatively broad review.  
Inherently, this review covers a variety of themes, and relies on sources that, at 
times, may disagree with each other. Moreover, such an exercise may be characterised as 
incomplete from the perspective of some who may feel insufficient weight has been given to 
some points compared to others. The authors have sought to address these potential 
criticisms by holding a very open consideration of potential papers and having the synthesis 
reviewed by multiple parties. 
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The UK model of regulation can further the interests of consumers, largely indirectly, 
including by promoting competition and investment. While the precise methods by which 
these objectives are delivered differ for each sector, there are common objectives and foci of 
regulation across sectors. This commonality can include the setting of price controls that 
create an efficiency challenge but leave scope for companies to profit by outperformance. It 
also includes setting standards and enforcing obligations so that firms that do not comply are 
subject to financial penalties. The legislative framework was set by government, with 
independent regulators accountable to parliament being a relatively new framework at a 
global level at the time of its inception but which has since come to be relatively common in 
developed economies; the model is designed to be independent of at least day-to-day 
political interference that might create excess uncertainty for firms or raise concerns about 
undue influence. The model has been updated over time, with quite a substantial increase in 
the number and complexity of legislatively-mandated regulatory objectives1, including an 
increasing focus on issues beyond competition, such as support for vulnerable consumers2.  
With the maturing of the model, debate has increased about the extent to which it 
delivers both good outcomes for consumers and the investment required to transform our 
infrastructure to respond to challenges around climate change, population growth and 
digitisation. Manifestations of this debate include:  
                                                 
1 For example, see the evolution of the statutory duties of the GB gas regulator in Figure 1, pg 36, Chapter 3 
‘Institutions and Policymaking: A Tale of Increasing Complexity’ in Deller, D and C. Waddams Price (Editors) 
(2018), 'Fairness in Retail Energy Markets? Evidence from the UK', a report by the Centre for Competition 
Policy as part of the UK Energy Research Centre’s (UKERC) research programme, available at: 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/18232983/CCP+%26+UKERC+-
+Fairness+in+Retail+Energy+Markets+Report.pdf/6499c409-10c9-8f5a-73a3-0290b5ab022f . Figure 1 is the 
result of research by Michael Harker and David Reader. 
2 There has been some focus since the beginning, with special conditions for those of pensionable age. 
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• The National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) has provided a report to the 
Treasury with an assessment of what changes to the existing regulatory framework 
might be necessary to facilitate future investment needs, promote greater 
competition and increase innovation in order to meet the needs of both current and 
future consumers.3  
• The Treasury has recently consulted on whether there is a case for 
strengthening the regulatory approach to encourage innovation.4  
• The National Audit Office has produced a report on regulating to protect 
consumers looking at Ofwat, Ofgem, Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority.5  
• The Public Accounts Committee has published a report looking at consumer 
protection in these markets, including at how effectively the regulators are protecting 
consumers’ interests.6  
• Lord Tyrie, Chair of the CMA, has recently presented a proposed programme 
of reform to the competition and consumer protection regimes that he asserts would 
improve the way the current framework delivers for consumers.7  
                                                 
3 See NIC (2019) Strategic investment and public confidence. https://www.nic.org.uk/publications/strategic-
investment-and-public-confidence/.  
4 See Treasury (2018) Encouraging innovation in regulated utilities: consultation. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752041/encou
raging_innovation_in_regulated_utilities.pdf.  
5 See National Audit Office (2019) Regulating to protect consumers in utilities, communications and financial 
services. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Regulating-to-protect-consumers-in-utilities-
communications-and-financial-service-markets.pdf.  
6 See House of Commons Committee on Public Accounts (2019) Consumer protection.  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/1752/1752.pdf.  





• In addition, new proposals are under development for the creation of 
increasing regulatory oversight in light of digitalisation, following the publication of 
Unlocking digital competition, the report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel.8 
Given these consultations, it is particularly important to distinguish evidence from 
perceptions. As is increasingly evident from the delivery of internet news, perceptions can 
diverge substantially from evidence. To the extent that evidence supports the perceptions, it 
is important to be clear about how they do so. To the extent that evidence is in disagreement 
with the perceptions, highlighting the findings of key pieces of evidence is critical to help 
establish effective policy that delivers in the long-run. The purpose of this review will not only 
be to synthesise what the selected sources say, but also to analyse them critically and identify 
gaps meriting further study in the future, to the extent that these exist. 
For the purpose of this review, and at the request of the UKRN, the effectiveness of 
the UK regulatory model is considered in terms of the extent to which it has facilitated 
investment, promoted competition, increased innovation, and protected the interests of 
consumers. These criteria can be applied to some of the recent policy developments. To name 
two, the interest in fairness can be framed as one of whether and which consumer interests 
are served; the question of how digitalisation is affecting society in these domains can also be 
addressed through competition, consumers and investment angles. 
The literature review contains two parts. 
• The first is a short synthesis of the key conclusions that can be drawn from the 
literature review, including any caveats, uncertainties or gaps in the research. This is 
                                                 





intended to be concise and includes references to the main studies relied on to 
substantiate conclusions. Where possible and appropriate, we illustrate findings with 
examples and quantitative information from the studies that have been reviewed. 
• An appendix lists the papers reviewed and provides, for each paper, a short 
summary of the main results/conclusions, together with a short critical review of each 
paper and questions that arise for the future. 
The aim of this review is not to build the case for a predetermined point of view, but 
rather to independently review and understand what the current literature says about the 
effectiveness of the UK regulatory model in a way that can inform current debates.  
 The review will proceed as follows: 
• Section 2 provides an overview of the methodology; 
• Section 3 provide the core analytic content of the synthesis, with an integrated 
overview of findings from selected prior research; and 
• Section 4 identifies possible areas for future research. 
 
2.0 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology used in the review. It explains how studies are 
selected, how those that are considered are prioritised to produce a final collection, how they 
are reviewed and the techniques for including in the synthesis. 
The papers were selected based on the initial list proposed by the UKRN and then 
iterated through consultation with authors and the public (through a social media 
announcement). The studies selected do not focus exclusively on UK experience, as 
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international comparisons of the effectiveness of the UK regulatory system with those of 
other countries can be relevant to this work, particularly to the extent that relevant data 
comparisons are possible across countries. 
 
2.1 Identifying studies for consideration 
The method for finding other studies included: 
1. Search of working paper series; 
2. Contacting the authors of the publications in the list to see whether the 
authors recommend other papers or have work in progress that is on point but not 
yet released; and 
3. Opening a web submission form that was advertised via the CCP twitter 
account, (to which 3000 people subscribe) and posted to relevant fora, providing an 
opportunity for experts and the public to suggest papers and studies to include in our 
review.  
 
2.2 Prioritising studies 
In selecting papers for detailed review, weight was given to: 
1. Considering a range of different types of study, with less emphasis on 
reviewing very similar papers, and more emphasis on papers that themselves review 
the earlier literature.  
2. Prioritising studies from amongst those that might be equally relevant, with 
preference given to more recent papers.  
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3. Considering the weight accorded to conclusions of consultancy and advocacy 
studies compared to studies published in peer-reviewed journals, while recognising 
that academic work itself is not necessarily free from bias. 
This study is intended to focus on the overall effectiveness of the regulatory system, 
rather than the effectiveness of particular policies regulators have adopted. Nonetheless, to 
the extent that the literature on the overall effectiveness is limited or does not distinguish 
between overall effectiveness of the regulatory system and particular policies, we do consider 
the effectiveness of large policy interventions, as a proxy for the overall effectiveness of the 
regulatory system. 
 
2.3 Reviewing studies 
For all the key studies identified, a paper-by-paper description was prepared (see 
Appendix) that: 
(1) Provides a precis of the key results; and 
(2) Critically analyses the approach of the paper. For quantitative papers, this can 
include evaluation of the models, data and empirical analysis used; for qualitative 
papers, this can include consideration of the characteristics of the sample and its 
appropriateness for the conclusions made. 
Not all cited papers are included in the appendix. Exclusion of a source from the 
appendix should not be taken to imply the paper is not valuable, just that it did not meet 
some of the prioritisation criteria for inclusion in the appendix.  
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In this review, appropriate recognition is given to the fact that qualitative approaches 
can be useful when analysing effectiveness and that not all questions of interest can be 
answered using statistical methods. More generally, to the extent that some questions are 
not easily answered empirically, there may be a publication and research bias towards those 
questions that will yield interesting empirical results as opposed to those that deliver valuable 
qualitative results. Furthermore, in some respects, published papers sometimes have been 
mainly prepared more than a year before publication, and the lag between research and 
publication may affect the availability of published analyses of the most current policy 
questions. 
 
2.4 Synthesising results 
Based on the literature review provided in the appendix, conclusions have been 
drawn with reference to their evidence and caveats noted. We emphasise uncertainties or 
gaps in the research that may be worth addressing in the future. The synthesis is concise in 
order to be of the most value to its readers, while allowing readers to seek more detail in the 
appendix or the cited papers themselves.  
 
3.0 Synthesis 
This section synthesises the results from the reviewed papers, seeking to integrate 
them in a way that makes thematic sense, with themes including international comparisons, 




The synthesis is divided into two parts, one with international evidence on UK 
performance, which is inherently more comparative, and one primarily discussing domestic-
focused research, which is more weighted towards non-comparative evaluation. 
 
3.1 International comparison 
Often, the UK regime is considered as one of the strongest among major countries. 
This conclusion is often lost among the regulator-specific criticisms that are natural and which 
abound, as well as being demonstrated in key topic-specific debates evidenced in the 
appendix. While being at or near the top of rankings internationally is certainly not a reason 
to avoid future changes and improvements to the UK system, the positioning of the UK can 
easily be forgotten when discussing options and failures. In perhaps the most detailed study 
of perceptions of regulatory quality in Europe, Hanretty et al. (2012) surveyed regulatory 
experts from five countries (comprising regulators, regulatees and academics), with each one 
asked to rate 5 key regulators in their country on a pair by pair basis (the sectors considered 
included energy, telecom and water)9 as well as to rate their national regulator against the 
regulators in four other countries on a sector by sector basis. Specifically, the respondents 
were asked which regulator does “better work”. The responses thus provide an overall 
assessment of regulators’ perceived quality that builds on the expert knowledge of 
practitioners. The results from integrating these pairwise comparisons are presented in Figure 
1. They suggest that the mean perception of UK regulatory quality is significantly above that 
of other countries. 
                                                 
9 Rail regulators and competition authorities were also included. 
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There is a seeming dissonance between international comparisons and domestic 
views. Further exploring the reasons for this gap seems potentially important with it possible 
to hypothesise a range of possible explanations. One may note that the data on which the 
international comparison relies is likely somewhat dated, though it is the best available at the 
time of writing. In recent times, it may be worth considering whether the potential political 
challenges to the UK regulatory model are motivated as much by those seeking a change in 
the objectives (or at least a change in the balance between existing objectives) that regulators 
pursue as by a sense that the ‘traditional’ objectives of regulation are not being met. Related 
to this is the possibility that the Financial Crisis and its aftermath have, in the UK especially, 
resulted in a changed view of regulatory priorities10 together with reduced confidence 
(unreasonable or not) among commentators and the population in the competence of 
technocratic economic bodies. Some respected observers even suggest a repayment of 
“excess profits”11 which would break the implicit contract set between the government, 
regulators and regulatees during the last three decades12. 
Figure 1. Regulator perceived quality by country  
                                                 
10 On both points, see Koop, C & M Lodge (2019). 
11 See Citizens Advice (2019) suggesting that a £7.5b “windfall” of “excess profits” by energy companies 
should be returned to consumers. 
12 The Windfall Tax on privatised utilities from the newly arrived Labour government in 1997 may be an 
example of breaking this implicit contract, one rationale having been that state-owned assets had been sold at 




Source: Hanretty et al. (2012) 
This type of point is also made in some sector-specific studies, such as Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) which suggests that independent regulation in the UK was seen as a 
benchmark for telecom regulators in other countries. 
O’Mahoney (1998) examines productivity levels between the UK and France, 
Germany, Japan and the US. She finds productivity gaps narrowed, and that this change was 
particularly strong in the late 1970s prior to privatisation. The main exception to this 
experience was in UK the water sector, in which prices rose 40% in real terms for average 
unmetered bills in the UK, possibly following new investments that had long been delayed 
and improvements to meet EU regulations. 
17 
 
With respect to some specific elements of performance, RAND (2012) judges that 
the UK has managed mobile mis-selling better than other countries. RAND also notes that, for 
access to emergency services over the internet, the UK approach has been followed by the 
EC. 
 
3.2 Domestic analysis 
The domestic analysis focuses on analyses of enhancing competition, consumer 
benefits, promotion of innovation and facilitation of investment. These are by no means the 
only objectives that have been posited for regulators. However, they may be considered key 
traditional economic criteria for assessing whether regulators deliver on their objectives. As 
political objectives evolve, pressure has been placed on regulators to change their views and 
approaches. Particularly for questions of distributional fairness, the traditional view is that 
the key decisions involving distributional value judgements are most appropriately taken by 
politicians, not unelected regulators who, in the UK at least, do not have a direct electoral 
mandate to represent the public.13 
Employing qualitative historical analysis of the national ownership experience after 
World War Two, Tutton (2019) suggests that regulators have a major role in ensuring the good 
operations of enterprises whether under private or state ownership, as many governance 
problems arose with UK nationalised industries in the absence of independent regulators. 
3.2.1 Enhance Competition 
Other key points evolve from the initial setup of the regulatory model during the era 
of de-nationalisation of the network industries. One major point is that competition has been 
                                                 
13 The traditional view merits further research to explore its economic and political economy implications. 
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a key driver of consumer and productivity benefits in the energy and telecommunications 
arena. The simple change in ownership arising from denationalisation was perhaps not, in and 
of itself, a major driver of consumer benefits, though the preparation to make an industry 
ready for privatisation in many ways was, achieving the initial productivity boost that could 
have been thought to come after privatising.  
Florio (2003) suggests that privatisation was not responsible for improved 
productivity, but that regulation may have been, as there was no structural break around the 
time of privatisation. Parker (2004) makes a more subtle assessment of privatisation’s 
impacts, suggesting that the key factor behind success in the privatisations was the extent to 
which they were followed by an unleashing of direct competitive forces. Markou and 
Waddams Price (1999) and Parker (2004) suggests that, to the extent competition did not 
develop, regulation was more crucial to performance improvements than the privatisation 
per se. At the same time, Parker (2004) suggests that even if there was not a step-change in 
efficiency following privatisation, this may not be surprising, as the privatised enterprises 
were groomed for privatisation prior to their sale into the market, with a strong push to 
improve their performance to make the companies more attractive to private stockholders. 
Florio and Florio (2013) suggest that within the EU15, “public ownership seems to have 
capped residential electricity prices more than regulated competition” and that, where the 
public sector has “a tradition of reasonably effective management”, public ownership can still 
play a valuable role. NERA (2019) in contrast, in a report commissioned by a major energy 
company, suggests that private ownership in and of itself can be responsible for many 
improvements, including in operating costs, prices, levels of investment and quality of service. 
They assemble UK and international evidence for their points, together with case studies from 
Australia and Germany.  
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Cave (2016) suggests that competition in mobile telecommunications has largely 
been achieved, while fixed telecom has “exhibited a different and much more chequered 
history”. Genakos et al. (2018) finds that more concentrated mobile markets have higher 
prices and higher investment, emphasising the competition/investment trade-off. Cave 
(2016) notes that the UK separation model for fixed telecommunications infrastructure has 
not been followed by other EU countries. Edwards and Waverman (2006) find that 
independent regulators in the telecommunications sector reduce the price-increasing effect 
of state ownership of telecom operators, creating an environment more conducive to entry 
and consequent investment by reducing the price of wholesale access. 
More generally, the competition/investment trade-off remains a difficult one in the 
UK, as elsewhere. One perceived weakness of the system, noted by Koop and Lodge (2019), 
may be that on some occasions, it could tend to encourage incremental investments even 
when transformational investments may be what are needed. Having said this, it is clear that 
transformational investments have been made in a number of cases.  
While competition may work in many positive ways for typical or “active” customers, 
there is increasing concern about what to do about vulnerable and “inactive” consumers. The 
inactivity, for example, can lead to a “loyalty premium” (see Citizens Advice 2018). A key topic 
thus becomes how to define fair treatment of customers by companies, particularly to the 
extent that customers are able to shop around and move if they desire to do so.  
There is evidence to suggest that disengaged customers can receive worse deals, 
much of it developed by Waddams Price and co-authors. A key question for policymakers then 
becomes whether this is a matter requiring intervention and, if so, what are the impacts of 
different potential types of intervention.  
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Littlechild (2017) suggests that regulators may have incorrect views of what 
constitutes a competitive market; he notes that such markets can admit price discrimination 
and different levels of efficiency and profitability for different firms. Moreover, to the extent 
claims are made regard excess profits, for example by Citizens Advice or the CMA, Littlechild 
argues these claims should certainly not be measured with respect to the lower and 
hypothetical efficient costs, which may be subject to large measurement error, but to actual 
costs, if such analyses are made. The implication of his view is that entry is relatively free in 
the energy market. Customers paying high tariffs, from incumbent suppliers, are doing so by 
free choice, which should not entail a basis for regulatory intervention. The trade-off 
between, on the one hand, eliminating cross-subsidies and making customers pay actual 
private or social costs of production and, on the other hand, ensuring that customers are not 
made unduly worse off from competition, is one that will involve continuing debate and 
research in the future. 
3.2.2 Promote Innovation 
Over the period since privatisation, innovations have, in many ways, been largest in 
the telecommunications sector while requiring large investments from operators. In some 
respects, recent regulatory incentives in the EU that push provision towards a fibre-to-the-
home approach can generate very high system rollout costs that at least some customers may 
not value particularly highly and would not voluntarily pay for; similar issues may also apply 
to some cost increases in the energy sector related to certain policy aspects of 
decarbonisation. There may be merit to evaluating the extra value derived by consumers from 
new investments while considering the extra cost of those investments. 
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Bourreau et al. (2017) provide an excellent qualitative discussion of how 
technological neutrality by regulators in the telecom area promotes innovation and efficient 
investment. They raise the concern that EU regulations for very fast internet connections 
cross the line away from technological neutrality, effectively pushing for fibre to the home, 
which is both a very expensive technology and one for which customers are generally not 
willing to pay a much higher price for the service though this is based on past valuations and 
does not necessarily reflect potential future growth effects. The paper suggests that the 
different existing infrastructure in different European countries provides different 
opportunities for increasing speed, and that Belgium and Portugal’s cable distribution 
network led to higher telecom investment, while Italy’s absence of cable may have been 
related to lower investment. This contrasts with Cave and Shortall (2016) who find empirically 
that there was no systematic association between telecom incumbent investment and cable 
coverage.  
3.2.3 Facilitating Investment 
In a broad and authoritative review of privatisation, Parker (2009) finds that the core 
rationale for independent regulation was “that continued regulation by Government 
department would deter investors”. He further made this point with respect to advice by 
investment bankers on the flotation of BT. This point is borne out by seminal work by Levy 
and Spiller (1994) and Majone (1996, 1997) which suggests that the state will commit itself to 
regulatory regimes and decision-making; the commitment to regulation facilitates long-term 
investment (and “without such commitment, long-term investment will not take place”). 
Investment in the energy, telecommunications and water sector has been 
substantial under the UK regulatory model. The investment climate for regulated companies 
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has, rather naturally, remained contentious. CMA (2016) examines the fundamental question 
of measuring profitability. It suggests that return on capital employed (ROCE) is most 
appropriate for asset-intensive activities, while for asset-light products, a focus on margins 
(EBIT/turnover) may be most appropriate. The key point for determining the appropriate 
return on investment in asset-intensive networks, however, is one on which CMA and 
businesses may differ, with the CMA focusing on the cost of debt for ROCE, in comparison to 
private enterprises that may often have required rates of return for internal approval of an 
investment much in excess of the CMA figure. In relation to the CMA’s Energy Market 
Investigation, Littlechild (2017) suggests that the CMA approach excessively relies on 
comparisons with small companies that might not have viable long-term business models, 
and it is not the role of government to judge that all providers should have the margins of the 
lowest margin firms. Citizens Advice (2019, 2015), in contrast, suggests that regulators have 
systematically overestimated the cost of capital in past price reviews, and that shareholders 
have consequently been overpaid. They suggest that companies should hand back some 
proportion of historical overpayments and that regulators should adjust their cost of capital 
calculations in a specific way. Substantial efforts have previously gone into estimating 
appropriate costs of capital in a neutral way that follows Treasury guidance; consumer-
focused organisations might be expected to argue for allowing lower profits with the 
expectation that this would lead to lower prices. The suggestion that profits already paid out 
under an established regulatory regime should be in some sense be returned to customers 
would break the implicit contract between regulator and regulate, though this would not the 
first time this has happened in the UK, considering the institution of the one-time Windfall 
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Tax in 199714. This implicit contract is designed to incentivise cost-reducing/productivity 
enhancing investments by allowing firms to capture a temporary increase in profits until the 
next regulatory review. Proposing to ‘take back’ profits from earlier periods risks introducing 
uncertainty that could undermine this system of incentives with the potential consequence 
of reduced future investment as well as criticisms of being an ex post modification of a 
contract by government fiat.   
Cambini and Rondi (2010) examine the impact of establishing independent 
regulatory authorities on investment in the regulated sectors, finding that both the existence 
of independent regulation and its extent increase investment. However, they do not look at 
the more interesting question of whether independent regulators led to optimal investment, 
albeit a question that is fundamentally more difficult to answer. Abrardi et al. (2017) find that 
independent regulation is positively associated with more investment, while noting that there 
is a distinction between nominally independent regulation and genuine independence, with 
an expectation that genuine independence is more crucial than nominal independence. 
Based on a review of the literature covering the water sector, Deller and Ennis (2019) 
suggest that independent regulators can have a significant role in enabling long-term 
investment when there is the risk of short-term opportunism by government or firms as the 
consequences of not investing infrastructure do not lead to an immediate drop off in service 
performance. Significantly, this argument suggests independent regulation has a useful role 
under government ownership and operation of the water sector by counteracting political 
pressures to set low prices that are insufficient to finance investment or, alternatively, a 
financial preference to limit public borrowing.  
                                                 
14 Arguably, the Windfall Tax would have been more related to the initial government decisions on privatisation 
share prices, while CA proposals would be more related to regulatory decisions since privatisation. 
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Edwards and Waverman (2006) find that independent regulators in the 
telecommunications sector reduce the price-increasing effect of state ownership of telecom 
operators, laying a foundation for more investment through a mechanism of access pricing. 
Briglauer and Cambini (2018) examine Western European experience with next generation 
network telecommunications infrastructure (NGN). They find that relaxing constraints on 
incumbent charges for access increases investment in NGN (by reducing the price differential 
between old and new fibre) and increases coverage. But the policy, while resulting in 
substantial increases in coverage, does not result in consumer take-up of NGNs to the same 
degree. This illustrates that one policy instrument (regulated prices for access) cannot easily 
achieve dual goals of expanding coverage and equally expanding adoption. Cave et al. (2019) 
note that Germany and the UK imposed obligations on fibre services to provide access via a 
bitstream equivalent system, which has led to investment by competitors, while France, 
Portugal and Spain promoted infrastructure competition by making ducts and poles available. 
In the latter case, primarily the incumbents made investments. Generally, the authors 
conclude that intrusive regulation of fibre assets deters fibre investment levels.  
Nardotto et al. (2015) find that the benefits of local loop unbundling (LLU) may be 
outweighed by the lowered investment incentives for incumbents, as in the long run, 
penetration was most increased by cable competition, rather than LLU. Cadman (2010) 
suggests that functional separation in the UK helped to create “the right conditions for 
dynamic efficiency gains in access and downstream broadband markets”. 
While government typically has not focused on specific technologies, in some limited 
cases it has held a view. This has applied with respect to ultra high-speed broadband rollout 
and de-carbonisation of electricity production. One question that can arise from government 
or regulatory adoption of particular technologies (as opposed to outcome objectives) is the 
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extent to which either consumers will value the increased system costs from such 
investments. Bourreau et al. (2017) suggests that consumer valuation of the move to ultra-
high speed broadband may not counterbalance the cost of high-speed broadband, and Feasey 
et al. (2018) suggests that take-up in European areas served by the private sector is below 
40%, though these findings may reflect current and past valuations and takeup more than 
future ones, as well as not fully considering potential growth impacts (Abrardi and Cambini 
(2019)). The imposition of a government view on investment in specific technologies as 
opposed to outcomes is debated and raises a potential challenge of whether and how to co-
ordinate government strategic investment objectives with sector regulator oversight on 
investment. The recent NIC (2019) report suggests that governments may produce Strategy 
and Policy Statements that could help to co-ordinate.   
 
3.2.4 Consumer benefits 
Consumer benefits have various dimensions, including quality of supply (partly 
associated with the level of investment), lower prices and lower state subsidies to previously 
nationalised industries.  Those papers which deal with quality of supply support the 
proposition that this has increased (showing, for example, that quality-adjusted price 
reductions have been greater than unadjusted reductions).  Several of the studies which focus 
on price effects relate to the early post-privatisation period - complicated by the 
government's desire to enhance flotation prices, as well as by, in the water industry for 
example, the need for substantial post-privatisation investment.  
Nonetheless, the extent of quality of service improvements for telecommunications 
customers, for example, or from reductions in electricity blackouts, or from cleaner water, 
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have been identified in the past as quite substantial. Measuring the full value of some 
consumer benefits, such as the availability of the internet via mobile phone, is also difficult to 
calculate, particularly because of the absence of recent counter-factuals. Markou and 
Waddams Price (1999) finds that regulators were increasingly drawn into quality issues, with 
the BT privatisation lacking quality specification in the original flotation, an approach that was 
not replicated in the later privatisations. Some studies of price impacts seek to take into 
account quality of service improvements. Nardotto et al. (2015) note the quality benefits 
(with respect to coverage and speed of internet service) from local loop unbundling and from 
cable competition, finding that higher quality (in terms of speed) was primarily on the lines of 
new entrants, not the historical incumbent. Ajayi et al. (2018) find a substantial quality 
improvement for energy customers.  
One may easily forget that prior to the privatisations, the state was subsidising many 
of the network industries, placing a burden on taxpayers that has now disappeared and been 
reversed by the tax payments on company profits. For the purpose of this paper, we 
characterise consumer benefits as arising from factors such as lower prices or better 
consumer experiences, due to competition or regulation. There is a close linkage between 
regulation and competition on consumer benefits; separating the respective effects of these 
two elements can be empirically difficult, to the extent they are both introduced at the same 
time. A key aspect of regulation is in framing the nature of competition by influencing the 
institutional rules underpinning the market. In the water sector, regulation may be seen as a 
substitute to competition. To avoid duplication in this synthesis, beneficial findings related to 
competition, investment and innovation are sometimes reported in other sections. 
Recognising this overlap we suggest that the examination of the consumer impacts be read 
together with that of the competition, innovation and investment sections. We also note that 
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productivity improvements can increase opportunities for lower prices for consumers and so 
consider that these would be encompassed by this category. 
Since privatisation, the picture is not uniform but tends to show prices falling when 
competition or regulatory action has been forthcoming.  The independence of regulators has 
been an important factor for achieving such results, with Edwards and Waverman (2006) 
finding that independent regulators in the telecommunications sector reduce the price-
increasing effect of state ownership of telecom operators, arguably creating better pricing 
outcomes for customers. Domah and Pollitt (2001) and Markou and Waddams (1999) suggest 
that price reductions became pronounced after the first round of post-privatisation price 
reviews. The importance of the price reviews is confirmed by Florio (2003) with respect to BT. 
One helpful tool for regulators has been the presence of multiple companies in a sector 
allowing for intra-industry benchmarking. However, some prices have also risen as a result of 
increases in world wholesale commodity prices (as with energy) and as a result of government 
'policy costs' (as also notably with energy).  These points are expanded below. 
Seminal findings on the importance of regulation and competition for generating 
good results in the infrastructure sectors include Martin and Parker (1997), Markou and 
Waddams Price (1999), Newbery and Pollitt (1997), and Domah and Polllitt (2001), finding 
substantial gains in social welfare, with some skew of gains to producers and government (in 
the form higher tax revenues on profits and lower subsidisation). Littlechild suggests that the 
decline in prices for domestic energy customers was 26% in real terms between 1990 and 
1999 and that commercial customers gained 25-34%. Domah and Pollitt (2001) finds that 
companies were privatised with limited price controls, resulting in initial gains to companies 
via profits and related gains to government from the revenues achieved from the sale of state 
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assets, with consumers not doing so well. Subsequent tightening of price controls from 1995 
brought electricity distribution costs down and profits were put under pressure, with 
consumers faring better.  
According to Deller and Waddams Price (2018), electricity prices since the early 
2000s have returned to levels approaching those before privatisation. Much of the increase 
in retail energy prices since the early 2000s is likely attributable to rising global energy prices, 
outside of regulators’ control, and incentives for more renewable production, driven by 
legislation, but it is unclear the extent to which this explanation resonates with those beyond 
the regulatory community even if it is a distinction critical in forming a balanced assessment 
of regulator performance.  
After privatisation, while consumer prices declined, at least initially, in the energy 
and telecommunications sector, even as cross-subsidisation was reduced and prices better 
approximated marginal costs of production for different customers, the water sector in 
particular experienced higher prices (see Markou and Waddams Price, 1999). The higher 
prices in the water sector were not a surprise due to the substantial investments needed in 
the industry to meet water regulations mandated by the EU, particularly related to handling 
of effluent. Even with an expected increase in water prices, Saal and Parker (2001) suggest 
that price indices in the water sector increased at a faster rate than input costs. But the focus 
on rates of change can be disputed. The authors also suggest that total factor productivity 
(TFP) increased substantially in the privatised era. To the extent that water may not have 
experienced the same level of dramatic technological change as in sectors like 
telecommunications, there is not necessarily a strong reason to have expected changes to 
continue in the same way that they may have done at the end of the national ownership. 
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Shaoul (1997), for example, found that in the water industry, there were often significant 
efficiency gains prior to privatisation. They suggest that consumers might have been better 
off if profits had been lower. What is difficult to assess is the counterfactual of whether 
investments would have been at the same level with lower profitability. 
Erbetta and Cave (2007) analyse water sector allocative efficiency distortions and 
find that these declined over time using a data envelopment analysis with a stochastic frontier 
approach. They suggest that “The regulatory environment set after privatisation seems to 
have improved allocative efficiency through the elimination of the initial input distortions.” 
They suggest that these improvements could be a consequence both of the change in 
ownership and the performance assessment system set up by the regulator after 
privatisation. In work for Water UK, Frontier Economics (2017) working with Saal, finds that 
total factor productivity of the water sector improved by 64% between 1994 and 2017, 
adjusting for quality, and at least 27% when not doing so. The study also suggests that over 
the post-crisis years of 2009-2017, TFP growth was much more limited than in the prior 
period. Ajayi et al. (2018) examines productivity changes in electricity and gas networks in the 
UK since 1990, especially just before privatisation (Waddams Price and Weyman Jones, 1996) 
and finds that productivity has improved across the networks, with fastest improvement 
occurring in gas transmission. 
Abrardi et al. (2017) find that, over time and across multiple countries, regulatory 
incentives based on “outcomes” in the energy industry have become more common, with 
rewards working best for high performing companies and penalties working best for low 
performers. Citizens Advice (2015) suggests that output incentives in price controls have 
allowed some companies to achieve significant financial rewards based on their profits and 
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rates of return. They suggest that incentive payments should be dynamic, and only award 
exceptionally good performance.  
The decline in consumer prices subsequent to privatisations, and coming from 
competition, may not have been uniform with some consumer types often getting worse 
deals. This point has been made, in a variety of ways, by Hancock and Waddams Price (1995), 
Waddams Price and Hancock (1998), Markou and Waddams Price (1999), Florio (2004) and 
Waddams Price and Young (2003). The worse deals may have been a result of removing cross 
subsidies and making price signals less distortive. The beneficiaries of such changes may have 
been especially large-volume customers in contrast to poorer customers who may have been 
more costly to serve (NAO, 2001). Baldwin and Cave (1999) suggest that “It has not proved 
possible for regulators to separate the pursuit of economic efficiency from the social 
consequences of their actions”. Florio goes as far as to suggest that public sector net wealth 
fell substantially after privatisation, due to under-pricing of the enterprises/assets being sold 
and suggests the under-pricing was sufficiently large not to be counter-balanced by the 
ending of subsidies (implying lower tax rates on the general population) or the tax revenues 
from company profits in the regulated sectors. 
 
 
4.0 Agenda for future research 
This section outlines possible areas for future research, in light of the wide-ranging 
work summarised in the synthesis. 
 
One of the purposes of the literature review is to identify areas for potential future 
work, due to the limitations of existing research or the fact that key policy questions evolve 
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over time so that past research will not always directly address today’s challenges. Suggesting 
areas for future research is inherently a matter that implies professional, and to some extent 
personal, judgement. Some of the topics identified below come directly from the literature, 
but a key role of this work is to identify those topics that do not seem to be sufficiently 
addressed by the existing literature. To some extent, researchers may have focused on 
performing work in areas which have high quality or easily accessible data, which can divert 
the body of research away from those areas with poor data or with questions that are difficult 
to analyse with rigour, even if the answers to the questions are of particular policy 
importance. Moreover, the inclusion of a topic does not suggest that no research has been 
performed but that further attention and expansion of work may be particularly merited in 
the future. 
4.1 Focus on efficiency 
Continued research focus on efficiency impacts of regulation remains important, 
with notable recent contributions such as Ajayi et al (2018). After privatisation, the question 
of whether or not the new regulatory regime and ownership structure was increasing the 
efficiency of production was central. Cost efficiency must remain a central concern when 
considering the effectiveness of regulation: the final price that a consumer pays is not only 
determined by firms’ margins but also, fundamentally, by their cost structure. Cost efficiency 
can be examined particularly usefully in an international setting, although performance in 
some sectors, such as energy, may be easier to compare across countries than performance 
in the water sector. Many of the existing findings suggest that privatisation itself was not 
responsible for more efficient performance. At the same time, it is notable that taxpayer 
operating subsidies to the main regulated sectors were frequently paid prior to privatisation 
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and are not paid now.15 However, one might argue that the subsidies would have disappeared 
in any case, due to technical developments, and the extent to which this was true is worth 
investigating further.  
4.2 Assessing investment needs 
The ability of research to identify actual investment needs, and balance these against 
expected gains, is a fundamental question of regulation in all infrastructure sectors. While 
pre-privatisation investment may have been insufficient in some cases (e.g. water) or gold-
plated in others (e.g. energy), there is little academic economic research on optimal 
investment levels (and related, optimal system design). More effort would be valuable to link 
engineering sector-specific research with discussion of economic costs and benefits, to 
determine optimum capital and consequent investment or dis-investment to reach these 
levels. There may be a stronger case for this analysis in sectors for which customers do not 
have a quality choice (e.g., water) compared to those for which they do have a quality choice 
(e.g., many telecom products).  
4.3 Objectives of regulation 
Increasingly, the objectives of regulation have expanded over time, as documented 
by CCP research.16 Further analysis appears worthwhile on the consequences of this increase 
in primary and secondary objectives, from the perspective of board decision making and the 
legislative direction given to regulatory organisations. On the one hand, adding objectives can 
                                                 
15 Operating subsidies are distinguished from investment subsidies that may exist for certain rollouts of new 
investment. 
16 See Harker (2019) “Statutory duties and shaping the decision-making of an economic 





help to ensure that a full gamut of societal concerns are better reflected in regulation. On the 
other hand, including more objectives in regulation may reduce the clarity of decision-making 
criteria for board members, in particular, the question of how to balance competing 
objectives. Providing a large number of objectives, potentially gives board members increased 
flexibility regarding the path to pursue compared to when there are a smaller number of pre-
defined decision criteria. 
4.4 Behavioural biases and heuristics 
Behavioural research frequently identifies market distortions that may take 
advantage of consumers’ behavioural biases or heuristics leading to potential consumer 
harm. It is worth recognising that such findings may be used as a basis for expanding the scope 
of regulation relative to the alternative approach of encouraging market forces to resolve 
major failings and accepting that markets may not be able to address all policy objectives. 
Furthermore, even where behavioural issues may be identified, interventions to address 
them may risk unanticipated consequences linked to responses of market participants to the 
interventions (see Deller and Vantaggiato (2014), Sugden (2018)). Further attention may be 
needed to assess where regulation can provide solutions to behavioural failures and where 
the risks associated with intervention outweigh the often relatively marginal gains. This 
includes recognising that the regulated utilities, due to the importance attached to them and 
the existence of the regulatory framework, may be subject to more intervention, for good or 
ill, on behavioural grounds than companies in less regulated sectors. 
4.5 Fairness and vulnerability 
In the future, as more attention is paid to the impacts of regulation on sub-groups of 
the population (e.g. different income groups, disengaged consumers, and/or geographic 
areas), governing principles will be valuable to judge the appropriate boundaries for pursuing 
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regulatory responses that help one group but, through perhaps unanticipated waterbed 
effects, harm other groups. More research attention may be worthwhile to identify the 
appropriate balancing between winners and losers. To the extent that competition lowers 
margins overall, the poor are particularly likely to benefit (Ennis et al., 2019). A risk to avoid 
is a continuous chain of regulatory intervention where lowering prices at one point in a system 
leads to them rising in another, creating demands for additional interventions to improve the 
positions of the newly created ‘losers’. For example, Cave et al. (2019) finds a waterbed effect: 
In countries with low mobile penetration, a 10% lowering of mobile termination prices from 
fixed networks is associated with telecom plan price increases of 5%. In countries with high 
mobile penetration, and thus more mobile to mobile calling, the effect was smaller. Ennis 
(2006) finds a waterbed effect, with special calling plans for international long-distance calling 
segmenting customer groups and leading to lower prices for intensive users and higher prices 
for low users. 
The existence of waterbed effects may be particularly present when the price 
differences between ‘loyal’ consumers and those who frequently switch provider come under 
review. The UK has devoted a particularly large emphasis to vulnerable consumers and 
regulatory fairness, arguably much more so than other countries. The rural-urban investment 
divide for telecommunications services could be one feature of this, though much progress 
has been made to improve rural service since then (Rand (2012). Additional international 
comparisons on the types of vulnerability addressed could be valuable, as well as the follow 
on consequences of interventions on groups beyond the intended beneficiaries, which may 




In some areas of policy, the extent of cost-benefit analysis performed for new 
investments is increasingly weak and costs of political decisions are arguably hidden or simply 
not calculated. There is very little counter-balancing cost-benefit analysis in sensitive cases, 
including EU fibre to the home and UK energy supports, carbon targets, and renewable 
investment. This relative absence may be more related to government and legislative 
decisions than a challenge for regulators, but merits much deeper focus as predictions or 
estimates of what is “valued” by existing and future consumers are extremely difficult, absent 
revealed preference in real spending situations. The valuations of future consumers merit 
further research. The focus on financial transparency of decision making, that arose around 
the time of privatisation, and which supported consumer interests, is no longer equally 
present and is worth revisiting. Further research could look to identify the frequency of cost-
benefit analysis across different areas of decision making, together with the quality of analysis 
performed, and consider whether efforts need to be made to increase its use as well as 
institutional structures that could address the need for and value of cost-benefit analysis of 
government, political and regulatory decisions. 
4.7 Imposition of costs on the private sector and the public 
Increasingly, it seems that government is interested and willing to encourage (or 
directly take) ‘regulatory’ interventions, i.e. ones involving rules rather than explicit 
government expenditure, in sectors to address immediate political pressures but which may 
raise system costs substantially, albeit sometimes only in the long-term. This has arguably 
been the case in the energy sector and now the telecom sector in the UK. Increasingly, the 
transparency of these actions in terms of the extent of their cost and on whom these costs 
may fall is poor, though in one case (universal service obligations) there may be more clarity 
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about the legal potential for support payments via state aid rules or sector legislation (Harker 
and Kreutzmann-Gallasch, 2016 and Ennis (2004)). It seems worth research to consider 
whether systems can be designed that increase the transparency of system costs and assess 
whether in some instances it would be preferable if the costs were borne explicitly by the 
state. One might even consider whether mechanisms can be designed where bodies 
increasing regulation have to compensate those who bear the costs of new regulatory 
obligations.   
4.8 Digitalisation 
Digitalisation is creating new and often inherently uncertain impacts in 
telecommunications and energy (for example, via the new forms of data created by smart 
meters and by whom, how and whether these datastreams should be exploited) and in the 
future, more attention would be valuable to the implications and needs of sector regulation 
with respect to these developments. In particular, a new issue is the desirable split of 
responsibilities between regulators. Should decisions be taken with an emphasis on sector-
specific knowledge? Or based on economy-wide principles? Do the opportunities presented 




This synthesis paper has provided a high-level overview of literature that considers, 
evaluates or is relevant to the effectiveness of the UK regulatory model, particularly as 
represented in the energy, telecommunications and water sectors. The paper seeks to 
present a balanced and broad view of the findings that emerges from these papers, taking 
account of inherent commercial and non-commercial interests, while also pointing out areas 
37 
 
of weakness and strength. Disagreements over interpretation of evidence are inevitable in 
the regulated sectors; it is hoped that this review may provide an even-handed synthesis and 
assessment, stepping back from the intensity of media and political debate while identifying 
some potential areas for future research. One particularly interesting point emerging from 
some international studies of regulation is that, despite substantial domestic worries about 
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The aim of this literature review is to summarise key points of relevant articles to identify the 
light they provide on the effectiveness of the UK regulatory model, specifically the extent to 
which it has: 
• facilitated investment 
• promoted competition 
• increased innovation 
• protected the interests of consumers 
 







Abrardi, Laura, Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi (2017), 'The Impact of Regulation on Utilities' 
Investments: A Survey and New Evidence from the Energy Industry'. De Economist, 166(1): 
41 – 62. 
 
Relevance of the paper 
The paper is mainly relevant to considering the facilitation of investment as a result of both 
the existence of an independent regulator and the form of regulation applied. 
 
Summary 
The paper is both a survey of existing literature on the links between regulation and 
investment and a paper providing new econometric work undertaken by the authors 
themselves. 
 
Although the findings are complex (reflecting, as they do, multiple studies, conducted at 
different times over the last ten or more years), core themes would seem to be the 
following. 
 
• Independent regulation is associated with increased investment, although it is 
recognised that some instances of ‘formally’ independent regulation may, in fact, be 
not all that independent are not that independent in practice (for example, within 
the EU it is left it to national jurisdictions to comply with EU-wide directives 
mandating independent regulation).   
"Results show that the presence of regulatory agencies that enjoy 'real' 
independence has a positive and significant influence on investments, even 
after political interference and state ownership are accounted for." 
"Overall, the analysis suggests that the effect of the IRA [Independent 
Regulatory Authority] is positive on infrastructure investment, but only if it 
is genuinely independent, so as to effectively ensure its ability to credibly 
commit to a long-term policy course." 
• Incentive regulation or 'hybrid' regulation (involving elements of both cost of service 
and incentive regulation) tend to mean more investment than pure rate of return 
regulation, although, "even when incentive regulation is nominally in place, 
regulatory schemes in recent years seem to be more and more revolving around the 
cost-plus component, making them de facto hybrid forms of regulation". 
• Within incentive regulation schemes, the WACC tends to be a more powerful 
motivator of investment than X. 
• Within the European energy industry (with nominally independent regulators), 
there is no clear evidence that ownership (whether public or private) makes a 
significant difference to investment ("we note that government ownership still 
prevails in most European energy utilities"). 




• Within regimes with output incentives, rewards work best for high performing 
companies and penalties for low performers. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
One of the main strengths of the paper is how it highlights the complexities involved: some 
regulators may be nominally but not genuinely independent; some incentive regulation 
schemes may have significant cost of service components.  Given the difficulties of 
categorising either some regulators and/or some regulatory regimes, there is a risk that the 
conclusions are sensitive to the particular categorisation decisions applied. That said, the 
paper emphasises the value of genuinely independent regulation and gives a broad 





Ajayi, Victor, Karim Anaya, Michael Pollitt (2018), 'Productivity growth in electricity and gas 
networks since 1990', EPRG Working Paper 1841. 
 
Relevance 
The paper is relevant to the question of how has productivity changed in the energy 
networks since privatisation; it has the high value of adding quality measurement to the 
analysis. The inherent and unavoidable complexity of the calculations and the problems of 
multiple outputs (including quality), the degree of capacity utilisation at the start of the 
analysis and having to deliver on government policy objectives (like delivery of renewable 




This paper suggests that productivity has, by and large, improved across the energy 
networks over time (when quality of outputs is taken into account). The rate of 
improvement has been rather slow, albeit faster for gas transmission (possibly reflecting, in 
part at least, the relatively younger age of the network and the extent of spare capacity at 
the beginning of the period studied) and faster than for productivity in UK economy as a 
whole. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
It is not obviously clear what messages Ofgem (and other regulators) should be taking from 
this analysis, given the assumptions that are inherently needed in developing quality 
indicators needed to generate the results. This is not at all a criticism of the paper but, 
rather, a reflection of the difficulties of the questions posed, which are highly pertinent and 
to be preferred over approaches that do not measure quality or do so in overly-simple ways. 
One lesson, though, is that further work on ensuring comparable and detailed data for 





Bourreau, M., C. Cambini, S. Hoernig, P.L. Parcu, M.A. Rossi, V. Silvestri (2017) “The future of 
broadband policy, part 2: Technological neutrality, path dependency and public financing.” 
 
Relevance 
This report focuses particularly on investment impacts from regulation. 
 
Summary 
The primary point of this report is the EU regulations for the regulatory framework on 
electronic communications in 2016 deviate from the previous EU standard of technological 
neutrality and seem to advocate (based on the objectives of speed in Very High Capacity 
100 Mbps networks) optical fibre solutions for increasing speed of connection to all homes, 
with a potentially very significant increase in total costs for a result for which consumers 
have a very limited willingness to pay more. They argue that, through this approach, 
“investors would be deprived of the necessity to continuously analyse which type of 
technology best fits the current estimates of the demand for connectivity and, in turn, 
deciding which technology to use and where to invest, because it appears to the best option 
for each business case.”  
 
According to the 2002/21 Regulatory Framework, Member State “national regulatory 
authorities take the utmost account of making regulation technologically neutral that is to 
say that is neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the use a particular technology 
[…]”. 
 
The study examines substantial differences in infrastructure and technological possibilities 
by country, with residential distance from street cabinets for distributing calls varying 
substantially across EU countries, along with cable network distribution, meaning that the 
possibilities for improving speeds to the residence by different technologies also vary. 
 
Australia’s high speed experiment started with a fibre to the home objective that was then 
modified to a fibre to the node objective, which was much cheaper and faster to implement. 
Moreover, experience has shown that 80% of Australian households with very high speed 
options prefer to purchase under 25 Mbps service, suggesting a low willingness to pay for 
very high speed service. A US survey found that households were only willing to pay USD 3 
per month for increasing to a very high speed objective as opposed to a high speed 
objective.  
 
Lianes and Poblete (2014) show that market standards lead to the best outcomes when 
there is substantial uncertainty about the benefits of different technology. 
 
The paper suggests that strong cable network distribution in Belgium and Portugal spurred 
telecom investment in these countries, the absence may have discouraged investment in 
Italy, while Cave and Shortall (2016) found in their sample of countries no systematic 
relationship between NGA investment and cable coverage. They suggest that technological 
neutrality can be abandoned if it would create a market failure or lead to non-achievement 
of regulator objectives. Such market failures could arise from externalities or from impacts 
that damage competition. 
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The paper notes that access competition may be weakened, as LLU enabled access, but will 
need to move to bitstream access in large part with rollout of high speed to nodes and 
street cabinets, making installation of equipment much more distributed and less economic 
for existing DSL providers and new entrants. 
 
The paper discusses specifics of the broadband paths situation in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper is largely descriptive and summarises many other papers and national situations. 
Tables containing data are generally not present, though these may not be deemed 
essential for the purpose of the paper.  
 
The debate over appropriate means of delivering appropriate speeds of broadband to the 
economy is challenging. To fully address the possibilities, more consideration may be 
merited of future demand and willingness to pay, though this is clearly more speculative 
than current willingness to pay. Growth rates of data use may be growing at rates that will 
challenge other systems. The value that consumers will apply to further increases over 
broadband speed made possible by fibre to the home remain uncertain, particularly as the 
difference between takeup and coverage can already be large in many countries including 
the UK. The growth impacts may be worth considering, though difficult to control for, as 
noted in Abrardi and Cambini (2019), which also notes that while some sources that find 
decreasing marginal gains from speed, there are potential growth benefits of ultra-fast 
broadband, at least with partial rollout. Though results are complex.  
 
A key question that is not addressed by the paper is what is the appropriate role of the state 
when the government, whether directly or via regulators, imposes a substantial and 
unpredicted new cost on the private sector? This question is all the more important when 
that obligation also leads to an infrastructure design that limits competition. One possibility 
is that in the future, when governments select an infrastructure that would not be selected 
in a competitive market environments, governments should themselves provide full 
coverage of any increased expenditure above normal competitive expenditure. This would 







Briglauer, Wolfgang and Carlo Cambini (2018), 'Does regulation of basic broadband 








The paper examines the conditions which (1) drive investment in NGNs and (2) drive 
customer use of these networks.  A number of variables are included which might be 
expected to influence (1) and/or (2), including: the (regulated) prices charged for access to 
the legacy network; non-price factors affecting access to the legacy network; the quality and 
extent of the legacy network; the extent of urbanisation; the extent of competition from 
mobile services; and the market shares of new entrants in retail broadband. 
 
Focusing on the effects for Western European countries with developed legacy networks, 
the core result is that relaxing constraints on the prices that the incumbent can charge for 
network access: 
 
• increases investment in NGNs (through reducing the price differential between old 
and new fibre); 
• increases consumer take-up of NGNs (via the same route) but by less than the 
impact on supply; leading to 
• a widening of the gap between adoption and coverage. 
 
In other words, using one policy instrument (regulated prices for access to the legacy 
network) cannot achieve the two objectives of expanding NGN coverage and 
proportionately increasing use of the new capacity. 
 
The paper's econometrics show somewhat different results for Eastern Europe, not least 
because of the less developed legacy networks causing reduced impact from the unbundling 
regime. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The strengths of the paper lie in, (1) the conclusions in the need for policies to promote the 
take-up of fibre broadband which complement policies on access to legacy networks and in 
(2) bringing out of the differences between Western and Eastern Europe in respect of the 
latter's less developed legacy networks. More generally, the author’s point is that EU 




Cambini, Carlo and Laura Rondi (2010), 'Regulatory Independence, Investment and Political 
Interference: Evidence from EU', Journal of Regulatory Economics, August, 38(1): 1 – 26. 
 
Relevance of the paper 
Highly relevant to the issue of the effectiveness of the British regulatory model, given that 
the core rationale for independent regulation, when the main utility privatisations were 
being conceived, was to ensure adequate investment incentives for the privatised entities;  
and investment is one of the key evaluative criteria specified by UKRN.  
 
Summary 
This paper estimates the impact of the establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies 
(IRAs) on the level of investment by regulated firms.  The main independent variables are (1) 
a dummy variable for whether an IRA exists and (2) a measure of the independence of the 
IRA (a composite of five variables). 
 
The overall conclusion is that independent regulation (both its existence and its extent) has 
had a positive impact on the level of investment in the industries concerned, as would be 
expected from the pre-commitment value for investors of having an independent regulator. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
Strong points of the paper include: 
 
• a clear and concise articulation of the relevant theory, clear rationales for the 
specification of the independent variables and explicit allowance for the potential 
endogeneity of the existence of an IRA; 
• clear conclusions on the empirical impact on investment. 
 
Other points include: 
• In assessing the existence of an IRA, the authors lean quite heavily on the idea of a 
lack of ex post interference by a government in regulatory decisions.  The focus on 
the ex post is understandable because it would be much harder to measure ex ante 
interference, especially of the more informal kind. Having said this the composite 
measure assessing the extent of independence tries to reflect some of the formal 
dimensions which might facilitate ex ante intervention.  However, given that the EU 
mandates IRAs in industries like energy and telecoms and given that ex post 
interference would be clear evidence of limited independence, a government 
wanting to interfere routinely in regulatory decisions may mainly do this informally 
and in advance of the relevant regulatory decisions being taken.  This point also 
links to a point in the paper by Edwards and Waverman (also reviewed) which 
makers a distinction between formal regulatory independence (as indicated by 
measurable criteria) and informal independence (reflecting broader political culture 
and institutions). Edwards and Waverman argue that (1) the latter is possibly more 
important than the former and (2) high informal independence might reduce the 
need for high formal independence, and vice versa. 
• The paper is testing whether independent regulation boosts investment.  This is 
clearly an important issue in some countries and not just developing ones 
(arguably, a central focus of the NIC in the UK is on boosting investment).  However, 
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if the key question is about identifying and completing the ‘optimal’ level of 
investment (however this may be designed), the paper does not address this (much 




Cave, Martin (2016), '40 years on: An account of innovation in the regulation of UK 
telecommunications, in 31/2 chapters', Telecommunications Policy. 
 
Relevance 
This survey of telecoms regulation in the UK since the privatisation of BT covers all the 
criteria specified by UKRN (facilitation of investment, promotion of competition, fostering of 
innovation and protection of the interests of consumers). 
 
Summary 
The history of regulation and competition in telecoms is far more complex than in the other 
regulated sectors.  Major points in the paper include the following: 
 
• Telecoms regulation in the UK has been genuinely independent - unlike in, for 
example, energy, there has been a clear dividing line between government policy 
and sectoral regulation in telecoms. 
• Competition in mobile telecoms has been largely achieved. 
• The progress of competition in fixed telecom has "exhibited a different and much 
more chequered history". 
• Ofcom's compromise with BT over the operational separation of Openreach has not 
been followed by other EU countries. 
• Ofcom continues to grapple with reconciling the promotion of competition with the 
promotion of investment in ultrafast broadband.  Compared with other EU countries, 
so far this has tended to mean more reliance on incremental improvements to the 
existing BT network (fibre getting progressively closer to premises but not actually 
getting there), as against large-scale construction of FTTP (Fibre To The Premises). 
• Underlying this grappling has been the conflict between the tendency of facilities-
based (or infrastructure) competition to focus on areas with the densest populations 
and the desire to achieve universal access to the fastest broadband (for example, 
Australia is re-nationalising and re-monopolising the local loop with the goal of 
making fibre universal, and other EU countries have placed greater emphasis on 
policies fostering FTTP).  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The strengths of this paper are conveying the complexities of telecoms regulation and the 
extent to which some of the underlying conflicts in this area remain unresolved.  One 
question implicitly posed by the paper is the extent to which Ofcom's commitment to the 
promotion of competition has compromised the objective of facilitating investment (most 
recently, in FTTP).  However, as suggested by the Rand Europe paper (reviewed above and 
addressing an earlier time period), one of the features of telecoms in the UK has been the 
delivery of quite good telecoms 'outputs' through incremental (and sometimes relatively 
slow) policies. 
 
This, in turn, raises a more speculative question about the UK regulatory model.  Two 
features of that model are (1) the focus on promoting competition where possible and (2) in 
relation to networks, a preference for incremental investment/preservation of option 
values/avoidance of stranded assets over big, potentially transformational, projects.  These 
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features have arguably characterised Ofgem's approach to climate change-related 
investment in energy networks, as well as Ofcom's approach to investment in fibre.  These 
approaches can be justified, both in principle and in terms of achievements to date, but 
stand in contrast to those who would like greater commitment to non-
marginal/transformational investment in various forms of infrastructure, often carried out 







Cave, M., C. Genakos and T. Valletti (2019) “The European Framework for Regulating 
Telecommunications: A 25-year Appraisal” Review of Industrial Organisation. 
 
Relevance 
The paper is particularly relevant for competition and investment, particularly comparing EU 
developments to those in the US in the telecoms sector. 
 
Summary 
This paper provides an overview of telecommunications developments in Europe over the 
last 25 years, with some degree of comparison with Asia and the US. The paper focuses 
separately on fixed line and mobile developments. The telecommunications reforms 
beginning with the 1998 liberalisation of voice and infrastructure, followed by the 2003 
EU(?) framework, were followed by increased competition, increased investment, declines 
in price and increased penetration. 
 
Challenges highlighted include the substantial differences that still exist between broadband 
penetration, while “next generation access” lags behind the US with only 54% of EU 
households having such access compared to 82% of households in the US. Genakos et al 
(2018) finds that increased concentration in mobile markets leads to higher prices and 
higher investment, suggesting there is a competition/investment tradeoff. 
 
Germany and the UK imposed obligations on fibre providers to give access via a bitstream 
equivalent, which has led to less investment by competitors. In contrast, France, Portugal 
and Spain promoted infrastructure competition, by making ducts and poles available, an 
access product that is significantly less extensive than the unbundled copper loop. In the 
first case, primarily incumbents made investments, while in the latter case, investments 
were more distributed among competitors, including those with a relationship to the 
consumer. The authors suggest that “studies show that intrusive regulation of fiber assets 
deters fiber investment.” 
 
The paper finds mobile adoption in the EU has outpaced the US. Interestingly, price 
regulation has complex effects, with a 10% lowering of mobile termination rates (from fixed 
line networks) seeming to be associated with increases in mobile retail plan prices of 5%, a 
so-called waterbed effect, in countries with low mobile traffic, but a less pronounced effect 
in countries where mobile traffic was large, due to the increased volume of mobile-mobile 
telecoms traffic.  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper contains relatively little numerical analysis, but integrates the judgements of 
leading experts who have previously performed substantial empirical work. The paper 
focuses on identifying substantive questions for the future. The paper says little about the 
governance structures of different regulatory regimes. 
 
Major questions for the future include: (1) the extent to which oligopolies involving a small 
number of firms may be a problem that is not addressable by competition law, (2) 
impending changes in which software/service providers (e.g., Netflix) may rent the part of 
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the network necessary to deliver their product to the customer, such that a physical 
network could support multiple “tenants”. 
 
Roaming regulations have much reduced termination and origination charges outside of the 
home country, but no analysis exists to demonstrate these supposed benefits. There could 
also be a waterbed effect here, though identification is difficult. 
 
Merger policies for mobile services may have been overly focused on price impacts and 
insufficiently focused on investment impacts. More thought may be needed about network 
sharing arrangements that could reduce the need for duplicative investment. More 







Citizens Advice (2015), 'Many happy returns?  The consumer impact of price controls in 
regulated networks. Report. 
 
Relevance 
As with the 2019 Citizens Advice (CA) report, this paper is about the returns of regulated 
networks and falls mainly under the heading of protecting the interests of consumers 
(although it clearly also touches on the issue of facilitating investment). 
 
Summary 
This (rather longer) CA paper covers some of the same ground as the 2019 paper, e.g. the 
need for recalibration of cost of capital parameters and the greater use of indexation for 
those parameters.  The other main area covered is that of output incentives which offer 
companies the potential to earn higher rates of return if they meet specified 
output/outcome targets.  CA is not opposed to the use of such incentives but clearly thinks 
that the past/existing incentives (e.g. those for RIIO-1) have been too generous. 
 
The comments below focus on the incentives issue, as relevant comments on the cost of 
capital parameters have been summarised in relation to the 2019 CA paper. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
It would probably not be a controversial proposition to say that some network companies 
have done very well out of some of the output incentives in their price controls.  This has 
been true with RIIO-1 (an issue exacerbated by the length of the RII0-1 price controls), as it 
has also been, further back, with, for example, the Distribution Losses Incentive for 
electricity distribution companies.  Also, CA accepts that there will be a necessarily iterative 
aspect to setting incentives and that, in principle, incentives to deliver specific outcomes for 
consumers are a good idea. 
 
However, CA’s underlying point is that incentives should only reward exceptional 
performance which requires a 'dynamic benchmarking' dimension when setting incentives.  
Regulators will have their own views as to how far CA’s view is appropriate and whether 
their approaches reflect these ideas. Ofwat's declared aim in PR19, for example, is to do just 
that. 
 
The main question is whether, in the price controls currently being set or which will be set in 
the future, regulators have actually achieved CA’s objective of only rewarding exceptional 
performance.  There does not seem to be an issue of principle separating CA and regulators 
on the question of the desirable incentives to create in price controls and what the price 




Citizens Advice (2019), 'Monopoly Money: How consumers overpaid by billions', Report. 
 
Relevance of the paper 
This paper falls mainly under the heading of protecting the interests of consumers.  Unlike 
the papers reviewed surrounding the CMA's energy market investigation, this paper mainly 
concerns the regulation of networks and, specifically, the setting of network price controls.  
However, one of the (non-core) recommendations of the paper is that more use should be 
made of competition to deliver monopoly services and, therefore, part of the paper also 
falls under the heading of promotion of competition.  In addition, changing returns to 
network investment might be expected to have some impact on network investment 
(although Citizens Advice might not agree with this). 
 
Summary 
The paper argues that regulators have systematically overestimated the cost of capital in 
past network/infrastructure price reviews (albeit it recognises that there are extenuating 
circumstances for some of the alleged mistakes); that as a result companies/shareholders 
have been overcompensated and that: (1) companies should voluntarily hand back a slightly 
unclear proportion of these historical overpayments and (2) in future, regulators should 
correct their cost of capital calculations as follows: 
 
• index overall debt costs to a relevant 10-year moving average (as currently done by 
Ofgem); 
• index the risk-free rate component of the cost of equity, using a daily spot rate to 
update capital allowances on an annual basis   
• reduce the equity beta from what has been assumed in the past; 
• reduce the total equity returns figure also used in the CAPM calculation of cost of 
equity to 6.5% 
• stop aiming towards the top of estimated ranges for cost of capital  
 
In addition, Citizens Advice (CA) want: 
 
• currently listed network businesses to be prevented from exiting public markets, not 
least to avoid further reducing the range of share prices which can be used for beta 
calculations; and 
• more use of competition to undertake some network activities.  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
That past price controls have, in retrospect, overestimated actual network costs of capital is 
not now a particularly controversial position.  The size of some of the premia over 
regulatory value paid in various acquisitions support this position as, implicitly, does the 
current price control thinking coming out of, for example, Ofgem and Ofwat. 
 
So, broadly, regulators seem to be coming from not a hugely different place than CA in 
terms of how future price controls should be set, regarding some of the main parameters in 
the cost of capital calculation and, at least in some respects, with the proposals for 
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indexation (although this would currently seem to apply more in respect of the cost of debt 
than the cost of equity). 
 
In addition, both Ofgem and Ofwat have moved to increase the role of competitive 
provision, at least, for major network enhancements. 
 
In terms of the overall recommendations, the one to prevent currently listed companies 
from leaving public markets would obviously be a step beyond what regulators have done 
(except in water, where the number of comparator companies has always been an issue 
when considering water company mergers). 
 
More generally, there are issues around: 
• the desirability of 'aiming up' when selecting point values from a range of values in 
the cost of capital calculation; 
• the internal consistency of the proposals. 
 
As far as aiming up is concerned, CA recognise the reason why regulators have tended to 
regard the risks of over-estimation or under-estimation as asymmetric but they assert that 
regulators should follow the evidence, while giving little weight to the possibility that the 
evidence will not always indicate point values (although the increased use of indexation may 
mitigate this problem). 
 
As far as internal consistency is concerned: 
 
• CA is quite keen, especially with respect to cost of debt, to disregard historic costs 
(i.e. the actual costs of embedded debt), even when the regulator accepts that the 
relevant costs were efficiently incurred - this is on the basis that high historic debt 
costs would not be remunerated in a competitive market.  More generally, CA 
seems, not surprisingly at a time of low debt costs, to be quite keen on the use of 
spot values, rather than longer term averages.  However, historic betas, which CA 
does want to use, presumably reflect that network companies are not operating in 
a competitive market. 
• More generally, in terms of consistency, there is always a question of what 
deference should, or should not, be paid to regulatory precedent.  However, again, 
if CA's preference for largely ignoring it is to be followed, it is not clear that this is 






Competition and Markets Authority (2016) 'Energy Market Investigation', Appendices 9.10 
('Analysis of retail supply profitability - ROCE') and 9.13 ('Retail profit margins'). 
 
We have summarised and evaluated both Appendix 9.10 (ROCE) and Appendix 9.13 
(margins) of the CMA's Final Report. 
 
Relevance of the paper(s) 
The main relevance of these two papers to the effectiveness of the UK regulatory model is 
under the heading of protecting the interests of consumers, as one of the core issues in 
utility regulation is protecting consumers from the exploitation of monopoly power through 
excessive profits.  Beyond this, the two appendices highlight the problems of measuring and 
comparing profitability in asset-light activities like energy retail, a recurring problem for 
other regulators.  In principle, the CMA has always preferred to measure profitability in 
terms of return on capital employed (ROCE) because this measure can be compared with 
the relevant cost of capital and this is why we have included a very brief summary of the 
ROCE appendix, as well as a summary of the appendix on retail margins.  However, as the 
CMA acknowledges, measuring capital employed in asset-light activities is highly 
problematic. 
 
Although the reviewed excerpts from the CMA's report relate mainly to the issue of 
protection of consumer interests, the report as a whole (as one would expect for a CMA 
report) is also obviously about whether the market arrangements of the time promoted 
competition (to which their answer was that there were several respects in which 
arrangements did not do so). 
 
Summary 
The CMA's core headline conclusions of the two appendices, taken together, are that: 
• the retail profitability of the Big 6 energy suppliers, taken as a whole, was above 
their cost of capital; 
• the margins earned from small/microbusiness customers and domestic customers 
(these were the reference market for the CMA) could not be justified on the basis of 
costs or risks, when compared with the margins from I&C customers or with the 
margins used in other GB regulatory investigations into energy supply. 
 
These findings fed, in turn, into the CMA's overall conclusion that the market under 
investigation was not a well-functioning market, with EBIT margins well above the figure of 
around 2% which the CMA thought would be consistent with the characteristics of the 
market. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The papers are a thorough analysis of what has been accepted by the CMA in other 
investigations to be a very difficult area - i.e. the assessment of profitability in 'asset-light' 
activities which do not lend themselves easily to ROCE calculations which can be compared 
with an estimated cost of capital. 
 




• Focus on margins (e.g. EBIT/turnover) and then compare these margins with 
margins earned in suitable comparator industries (i.e. industries which ideally have 
similar cost structures, levels of capital employed and risk profiles and which are 
also broadly competitive), with all the contentiousness which this implies about the 
selection of appropriate comparators. 
• Make a large number of often contentious adjustments to come up with a figure for 
capital employed and then compute ROCE. 
  
CMA argues that there is a rough consistency between the conclusions of the two 
approaches - that, after applying various assumptions and adjustments, the cost of capital 
for energy supply in GB is consistent with an EBIT margin of around 2%. 
 
The main questions relate to the problems inherent in estimating both actual and normative 
margins or returns on capital employed.  In the case of ROCE, much of the controversy 
relates to not only the usual issues associated with estimating cost of capital but also with 
the adjustments which need to be made to compute reasonable numbers for capital 
employed in asset-light activities.17  In the case of margins, the main problems centre on 
finding suitable industry comparators (and around the circularity associated with using 
previous regulatory decisions in this area).  The CMA's Energy Market Investigation will not 
be the last word on this issue, even for energy supply, let alone for other asset-light 
activities in regulated industries. 
 
These challenges are before one gets to some of the additional issues (covered in the wider 
CMA report) of identifying the associated customer detriment resulting from the judgement 
of limits to competitive pressures. These additional issues have been identified by Stephen 
Littlechild (see separate review for evaluation of his paper) and Citizen's Advice (two of 
whose papers are reviewed here). 
 
  
                                                 
17 It may be worth noting that the CMA did not complete equivalent calculations in its more recent market 
investigations into investment consultants. 
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Deller, D. and Vantaggiato, F. (2014), "Revisiting the Regulatory State: A Multidisciplinary 
Review Establishing a New Research Agenda", CCP Working Paper 14-9. 
 
Relevance 
This paper identifies areas for future research, including for consumers, governance and 
assessing regulatory performance after conducting an extensive mapping of the literature. 
 
Summary 
With respect to consumers, regulators may perceive themselves as acting for consumers, 
but the precise ways in which they can measure consumer desires and impacts are often 
lacking, particularly when consumers do not have a formal representative and assessments 
of the consumer interest may include a wide variety of perspectives. Consumer switching 
has been increasingly researched, with findings that consumers have often acted in ways 
that are not consistent with, arguably, excessively narrow definitions of what constitutes 
their ‘rational’ interests. The findings of behavioural economics may be used in arguments 
for increased regulatory intervention relative to the role of the market. Earlier papers often 
argued that greater competition may be the best protection for consumers. 
 
Incentive regulation may favour cost minimization rather than large regulation, when 
compared with rate of return regulation. In the context of political science, regulatory 
expertise is seen as the key factor legitimising independent regulation when this involves 
reduced control by institutions with overt democratic legitimacy. Much of the economic 
analysis described, focuses on how incentives acting on regulators as individuals may impact 
on the decisions they take and, hence, consumer outcomes. Historically, a key concern has 
been that regulator might be captured by the interests of those they regulate. 
 
In terms of regulatory governance and institutions, independence is viewed theoretically as 
a means to address the problem of time inconsistency, in which a political actor may 
promise private investors a particular return on investment, but are likely to face political 
pressures to renege on these commitment. However, the relative difficulty of changing 
regulatory institutions means that independence may also be used more generally as a 
device by one generation of political actors to constrain the activities pursued by 
subsequent political actors. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper does not include work after 2014. One subsequent piece that is relevant to some 
of the arguments is Robert Sugden’s book The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural 
Economist’s Defence of the Markets (2018) OUP. Also, the definition of “vulnerable 
consumers” requires particular care due to its potentially amorphous nature, the risk of 
regulators being drawn into value judgements that are better suited to democratically 
elected individuals. 
 
In all cases, regulators’ role in assessing the necessity of investment and predictability in 
regulators’ determinations are critical, and more research is needed about how different 




The review identifies a lack of robust research (and data) on individual regulators, their 




Domah, Preetum and Michael Pollitt (2001), 'The Restructuring and Privatisation of 
Electricity Distribution and Supply Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Benefit 
Analysis', Fiscal Studies. 
 
Relevance 
The relevance of this paper is somewhat constrained by its date of publication (2001) which 
means the period that it covers is most of the first decade after privatisation. Nonetheless, 
in looking at the gains and losses to various groups (the government, producers and 
consumers) of the privatisation and restructuring of the electricity distribution and supply 
businesses in England and Wales over that period, makes important points about the 
separate effects of (1) ownership and (2) policy (including regulatory policy). 
 
Summary 
The paper aims to perform a cost-benefit analysis on a part of electricity privatisation for 
society as a whole, where ‘society’ is seen as comprising the government, producers (the 
'Regional Electricity Companies' or RECs) and consumers.  As the paper explains, a 
considerable number of assumptions need to be made in order to undertake this analysis, 
not least assumptions about the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened if the 
companies had stayed in the public sector). 
 
However, the overall results for the 1990s are fairly clear: the companies were privatised 
with what in retrospect (and, to some extent, at the time) were seen as undemanding initial 
price controls.  As a result, in the first five years following privatisation, the Government did 
quite well in terms of privatisation proceeds, the companies did very well in terms of profits 
and consumers did not do so well.  With the re-setting of the (distribution) price controls 
from 1995 (after two attempts by the Office of Electricity Regulation), electricity distribution 
costs came down, profits were put under pressure (both by the new price controls and by 
the Windfall Tax) and consumers did rather better.  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper makes very clear that privatisation of monopoly businesses may not itself be 
good for consumers, especially in the short term when government is balancing the 
interests of consumers against its desire to get a high price for the sale of state-owned 
companies to the private sector.  However, the paper also makes clear that, when put under 
pressure from tougher price controls (from 1995), companies’ reaction in terms of improved 
cost efficiency was probably greater than if the companies had stayed in the public sector. 
 
What the paper obviously misses out on (because of when it was written) are key parts of 
the later post-privatisation story. These include the progressive effects of the supply market 
being opened up (there was a staged reduction in the scope of the RECs’ regional supply 
monopolies through the 1990s) and the continuing squeeze on distribution prices from later 
price controls (a process which itself was somewhat rebalanced, between operating cost 
reductions and increases in capital expenditure from the mid-2000s, in the wake of a 




Edwards, Geoff and Leonard Waverman (2006), 'The Effects of Public Ownership and 
Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
January, 29(1): 23 – 67. 
 
Relevance 
This paper is concerned with the general effectiveness of regulatory independence (across 
the EU) on a specific regulatory outcome - the interconnect rates charged by the incumbent 
public telecoms operator (PTO) to other telecoms providers.  As such, it is not concerned 
directly with the UK but, in so far as lower interconnect rates can be expected to be 
favourable to investment by challenger telecoms providers, the paper has relevance to the 
impact of independent regulators (including in the UK) on both investment and on 
competition (and thus on consumers of telecoms services). 
 
Summary 
The paper is concerned primarily with the interaction between (1) the extent of public 
ownership of the PTO and (2) the independence of the telecoms regulator - the hypothesis 
being that state ownership of the PTO would tend to raise interconnect charges (the state 
being the beneficiary of such charges), while independent regulation might mitigate this 
effect (with the regulator not getting any benefit from higher charges). 
 
The study uses a sophisticated database which aggregates 12 measures of regulatory 
independence to give an index of independence for each country.  The econometrics in the 
paper has interconnect rates as the dependent variable and, as the independent variables: 
the index of regulatory independence; the extent of state ownership of the PTO; and 
variables which proxy for the underlying costs of the PTO. 
 
The main findings of the paper are that: 
• state ownership of the PTO does tend to raise interconnect rates; 
• in the presence of state ownership of the PTO, this effect is mitigated by the 
independence of the regulator; 
• when there is no state ownership in the sector, the independence of the regulator 
has no effect on interconnect rates. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The strengths of the paper include: 
• the nuanced, and not totally predictable conclusion about the effects of ownership 
of the PTO and the impact of regulatory independence on a particular regulatory 
outcome, emphasising the value of independent regulation as a commitment where 
government has conflicting interests (in this case, as a result of ownership of the 
PTO), but the value of this commitment is reduced when the conflicts do not exist; 
• the sophistication of the measure of regulatory independence, although that this 
needs to be qualified, as is done in the following sub-section. 
 
One of the main questions with the paper is, in fact, raised explicitly in the paper itself.  This 
is the question of the relative role of, first, 'macro-political' institutions and culture and, 
second, the sort of 'micro-political' institutional arrangements represented by an 
independent telecoms regulator.  The authors point out that, for example, the UK only ranks 
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moderately on the formal index of regulatory independence while, at the same time, being 
generally seen as the benchmark for independent telecoms regulation (the paper was 
published in 2006).  The authors go on to speculate that the value of formal independence, 
as a commitment device, may be particularly beneficial in countries where the general 
macro-political environment is viewed as less favourable, i.e. where informal independence 





Ennis, S. and D. Deller (2019) “Water sector ownership and operation: an evolving 




This report is particularly relevant to the overall questions of governance and investment 
levels in the water sector. 
 
Summary 
This report suggest that independence of water regulators is particularly crucial when 
investment in water systems is needed. The operational risks for water systems are that, 
when under direct political control, there is a temptation to keep prices lower than long-run 
cost for political reasons potentially achieved by deferring investment to subsequent 
years18. This emphasises the benefit of independent regulation as a commitment device 
under public ownership. In contrast, under private ownership where private companies can 
benefit from the revenue stream, there is generally a view that regulation is needed to 
control potential monopoly pricing. Also, private involvement network industries will 
generally be limited in the absence of an independent regulator that can reassure investors 
that future political administrations will not renege on promises made by the current 
political actors.  
 
Equally there is a risk that, under rate of return regulation, investment may be higher than 
optimal, if the allowed returns on investment are higher than the cost of capital. This duality 
of risks suggests that while the regulatory focus may vary based on the type of ownership, 
water systems can benefit from the presence of independent regulators both when there is 
private and public ownership. 
 
The report provides an overview of evidence on productivity, pricing and investment across 
countries. It finds that in some countries soon after the establishment of independent 
regulators, investment levels seem to have risen. There is a substantial variation across EU 
states in the degree of sewage treatment, the extent to which water is lost in the system 
and the overall costs of the system. The quality of water is relatively uniform across the 
countries considered, probably due to EU water directives. Overall the UK appears a 
reasonably strong performer that appears to take a relatively balanced position between 
competing objectives. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The report does not draw any conclusion on which ownership systems may be most 
appropriate. However, it does suggest that there can be a relationship between the form of 
system management and the immediate needs of the municipalities that largely run water 
systems. The report suggests the value of further work on the relationship between 
independent regulation and investment in the water sector. 
 
  
                                                 




Erbetta, F. and M. Cave (2007) “Regulation and efficiency incentives: evidence from the 
England and Wales water and sewerage industry”, Review of Network Economics, 6(4):1-28. 
 
Relevance 
This paper is focused on productivity performance in the UK water and sewerage industry. 
 
Summary 
The paper reports results of a Data Envelopment Analysis, in the first stage, and the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach, in the second. The subject is whether incentive regulation 
resulted in improved performance. The data comes from 10 water and sewerage companies 
for the period 1992-93 to 2004-05. The methods advantages are outlined, including that it 
can incorporate environmental effects and statistical noise into the model. It also allows an 
evaluation of the impact of both the operational and regulatory environment on technical 
and allocative efficiency. 
 
The main conclusions are: 
 
• The 1999 price review showed significant improvements in technical efficiency 
(notably compared to that of 1994) 
 
• Allocative efficiency improved and “input-specific allocative distortions” declined 
over time, with over-utilization of labour and under-utilization of capital being 
remedied. 
 
• The “trend of managerial efficiency shows evidence of a significant improvement in 
managerial capacities during the observed period” 
 
• “The regulatory environment set after privatisation seems to have improved 
allocative efficiency through the elimination of the initial input distortions.” 
 
• “In terms of both technical and allocative efficiency, there is evidence of improving 
managerial performance. This may be seen as consequence of the change in 
ownership, as well as of the system of performance assessment set up by the 
regulator after privatisation.” 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper uses a more complex methodology than many older techniques for productivity 






Florio, Carlo V.  and Massimo Florio (2013), 'Electricity prices and public ownership: 
Evidence from the EU over thirty years', Energy Economics. 
 
Relevance 
One of the main reasons why this paper is relevant is its explicit attempt, within the 
electricity sector of the EU15, to disentangle the effect of ownership on consumer prices 
from the impact of other factors (like vertical unbundling and independent regulation etc.),.  
 
Summary 
The paper attempts, in various ways, to break out the impacts of different factors affecting 
domestic electricity prices.  In particular, it tries to separate out the effects of the different 
components of a 'British-style' reform package (privatisation, vertical unbundling, reducing 
barriers to entry and price capping by an independent regulator). It also attempts to control 
various other cost and demand factors.  Two conclusions stand out: 
 
• "Public ownership seems to have capped residential electricity prices more than 
regulated competition in Western Europe, probably because of illiquid markets, 
inadequate regulation or both." 
• "In terms of policy implications, this suggests that when there is a tradition of 
reasonably effective management in the public sector, for example in the 
Scandinavian countries, or in France, public ownership can still play a role in 
protecting consumers from oligopolistic competition in electricity supply." 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
One could probably spend a lot of time reviewing the econometrics of this paper and the 
adequacy with which it captures 'reform' variables, as well as all the other variables which 
can be expected to affect domestic electricity prices. 
 
However, one of the more obvious questions raised by the paper is in relation to its 
exclusive focus on domestic electricity prices.  In other words, there is nothing on how those 
prices have been achieved. 
 
• Have they, for example, in some cases been achieved by cross-subsidy between 
domestic and commercial consumers (the likelihood of this may be higher when 
there is political control of prices)? 
• Have domestic prices been held unwisely low, for example, by limiting long-term 





Florio, Massimo (2003), 'Does Privatisation Matter?  The Long-Term Performance of British 
Telecom over 40 Years', Fiscal Studies. 
 
Relevance 
The paper, published in 2003, tries to separate out the effects on BT's performance of: (1) 
privatisation, (2) regulation via price controls, and (3) liberalisation of the telecoms market.  
From the viewpoint of the questions posed by UKRN, the most relevant issue is the 
combined and separate impacts of (2) and (3). 
 
Summary 
The overall conclusion of the paper is that there was little observable impact on BT's 
performance (productivity, in particular) from privatisation per se.  The changes that did 
occur post-privatisation are attributed to regulation (particularly the impact on reducing 
workforce size when the price control regime was tightened some years after privatisation).  
Overall, the paper suggests that BT's performance over the period was consistent with 
'satisficing', i.e. maintaining a target rate of return and only pursuing efficiency savings 
when prices were progressively squeezed by price controls. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
What clearly emerges from the paper is the lack of any clear structural break in performance 
which can be associated with privatisation.  One possible implication is that, in the absence 
of strong competition, a single company can get away with satisficing behaviour in a way 
that is more difficult in a multi-company industry (gas and electricity distribution, water), 
where there is increased scope for benchmark competition/regulation.   
 
Since the paper was published, it is arguable that the main pressures on BT have come from 
competition and it would obviously be interesting to know whether this competition has 
produced the performance improvements which this paper suggests did not follow from 






Frontier Economics (2017) “Productivity improvement in the water and sewerage industry in 
England since privatisation.” 
 
Relevance 
This report focuses on productivity levels in the water and sewerage industry, which can 
ultimately be related to consumer prices.  
 
Summary 
This report updates Saal and Parker (2001) with more recent data on the water and 
sewerage industry. They use an index based approach to measuring total factor productivity 
with quality aspects separately adjusting the output indices, rather than serving as outputs. 
 
Annual total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated to have grown, after quality adjustment, 
by 4.5% from 1996-2000, then at 2.0% from 2001-2005 and 2.2% from 2006-2010. Over the 
business cycle period 2009-2017, the estimated TFP growth is much lower, 0.1% (and -0.1% 
when not adjusted for quality). The cumulative increase in TFP since 1994 is 64% including 
quality adjustments and 27% when not doing so. They suggest annual costs in 2017 would 
be £2.72b higher than the actual £9.98b, absent the TFP improvements. This  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
This study does not adjust for all measures of output, with quality measures, in particular, 
being notoriously difficult to measure. For example, drinking water safety from chemical 
composition or impact of sewerage treatment on river and bathing or the frequency of 
sewer flooding are not measured. 
 
Unlike Saal and Parker, operating expenditure is not broken down into labour and other 
inputs costs but rather treated as the union of both. The reason for this is to ensure greater 
data availability. 
 
The authors suggest that Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis could 
be successfully and usefully applied, though UK regulators have generally preferred to avoid 





Hanretty, C., P. Larouche and A. Reindl (2012) “Independence, accountability and perceived 
quality of regulators,” A CERRE Study, 6 March. 
 
Relevance 
This report is relevant to examining the overall quality of regulators, thus including all the 
impacts that are desirable from regulation.  
 
Summary 
This report examines independence, accountability and quality of regulators and 
competition authorities across 5 countries (BE, DE, FR, GB, NL) and four types of regulators 
(rail, energy, telecoms and competition authorities). The report focuses in particular on 
perceptions of regulatory quality, using pairwise comparisons as a route to determine an 
overall perceived quality ranking. The report finds that more independent authorities are 
also have higher levels of accountability. Most significantly, the quality measures between 
countries suggest that of the five countries surveyed, which include leading EU countries, 
the UK is rated as having the highest perceived quality of regulators, with a significantly 
higher perceived quality compared to every other country. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The typical route for establishing causality between regulatory governance and outcomes 
looks at particular outcomes, such as interconnection rates, and outcomes, controlling at 
the same time for a number of other potential factors that could affect interconnection 
rates. The accuracy of estimates then becomes dependent on the extent to which 
researchers have controlled appropriately for these other factors. This research takes a 
more direct route at assessing quality, though the assessment is based on perception. 
 
34 respondents from regulators, regulatees and academia made 399 pairwise comparison. 
For example, a regulator from the telecom sector in Belgium would compare the quality of 
the Belgian telecom authority to other regulatory bodies in Belgium and other telecom 
regulators in the four other countries in the study. Consistency and reliability were found to 
be high, including across types of respondent. 
 
The authors further developed a measurement technique to assess independence and 
accountability of regulators.  
 
The research method is necessarily conditioned on the expertise and judgment of the 
people surveyed. Given that those surveyed were brought together at the leading 
independent European centre on regulation and that the response came from three 
different types of experts, there is good reason to hope that the responses were from 
experts with both a good basis for judgment and accurate judgements. 
 
The research method is also based on perceptions, and subject to bias to the extent that 
perceptions are biased. The route of allowing experts only to express views either on their 
own country’s regulators or internationally in their own area of regulation helps to limit 





Koop, C. and M. Lodge (2019) “British economic regulators in an age of politicisation: from 
the responsible to the responsive regulatory state” (mimeo) 
 
Relevance 
This paper is of particular relevance for its comments on the changes in regulatory focus 
over recent years, particularly after the financial crisis, and discussion of consumer pricing. 
 
Summary 
Based on interviews with current and former senior regulators, the authors suggest that 
regulation has become more politicised since the Great Recession, as a result of worsening 
economic conditions bringing regulatory outputs under question, reduced belief in markets 
that pressures politicians to intervene more frequently and the impact of regulation on low-
income households. 
 
These impacts were particularly felt in energy, with the price caps discussions, Ofcom 
around the time of the Leveson inquiry and water with impacts of water bills and profits of 
water companies. 
 
Regulatory decision making was felt to have shifted attention from ensuring investors were 
adequately compensated towards focusing on consumer impacts, particularly “vulnerable 
consumers”. Such a focus was perceived as a way to restore or enhance trust in both 
regulators and regulation. 
 
One their key concepts is the distinction between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ 
adaptations by regulators to political pressure. In the former, the regulator changes some 
techniques (like its communications strategy) but does not rally change its fundamental 
world-view. With the latter, there is a more fundamental change in approach.   
 
One reason why this looks so relevant to the current effectiveness of the UK regulatory 
model is that it could be argued that Ofgem sits in the first category (being unwilling to shift 
from its focus on supplier competition, even in the face of pressure to deliver for 
‘vulnerable’ and other disadvantaged consumers - whereas Ofwat would seem to have 
really rethought key areas of its fundamental approach, mainly in order to help restore 
‘legitimacy’ in the sector. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The questions to answer include the extent to which a consumer welfare standard was a 
sufficient objective for policy or whether this treated consumers too homogenously. Loyalty 
penalties were also felt to have distributional implications that required exploration. More 
generally, fairness has become a new focus of discussion. Whether this is appropriate for 
regulators, as opposed to politicians, is a key question of focus for the future, particularly to 
the extent that precise definitions of fairness are currently lacking (though one is 
forthcoming in ongoing work by Lyons and Sugden). Research on the effectiveness of 
consumer engagement by regulated companies and regulators is needed. Regional 
variations are also an increasing source of regulatory attention.  
 






Littlechild, Stephen (2017), 'The CMA's analysis of the retail energy market: an examination 
using textbook economics', EPRG Working Paper 1703, Cambridge Working Paper in 
Economics 1707. 
 
Relevance of the paper 
The relevance of this paper is on a similar basis to that of the CMA's profitability/margins 
analysis in retail energy supply (see above).  Both are concerned with whether the market is 
adequately protecting consumers from the exercise of market power.  In that regard, the 
relevance of the Littlechild paper is that it argues that at least one of the methods used by 
the CMA to estimate the detriment from the exercise of market power is wrong.  However, 
Littlechild's other underlying point, spelled out elsewhere as well, is that the CMA (and, by 
implication, other UK regulators) have an incorrect perception of what a well-functioning 
market looks like - and that such a market is consistent with price discrimination and with 
the survival of firms with different levels of efficiency and profitability.  (The CMA calculated 
the customer detriment of the retail energy market on the assumption that in a well-
functioning market all firms operated at near the efficiency level of the most efficient, on 




As implied above, the Littlechild paper makes two main points.  The one forming most of the 
paper is that the CMA mis-estimated the customer detriment resulting from the pattern of 
retail energy prices observed.  The CMA quotation which, for Littlechild, encapsulates the 
problem is as follows: 
 
"A large part of the detriment we have observed in the form of high prices 
is likely due to inefficiency rather than excess profits, such that if we were 
to eliminate the entirety of the detriment we have observed through a 
price cap it would create substantial losses for the sector as a whole." 
 
Littlechild's core point is that any excessive profits, due to the exercise of market power, 
should be judged relative to actual costs, rather than in relation to some (lower) 
hypothetical level of efficient costs.  The CMA's view, on the other hand, is that the 
weaknesses in the market (notably a lack of engagement/switching by some consumers) has 
allowed inefficiency to survive in a way which would not happen in a truly competitive 
market. 
 
Littlechild's other main point is that CMA simply has an incorrect view of how competitive 
markets operate.  His more 'Austrian' take is that competitive markets are a continuous 
rivalrous process which, at any one time, will still be working itself out.  Apparent 
inefficiencies amongst the major energy retailers may, in part, reflect the fact that 
improving efficiency is difficult and takes time. He makes the specific point that the CMA's 
benchmarking against the costs of some of the smaller energy suppliers may be invalid 
when some of those suppliers may not survive in the longer term (a point at least partly 




Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper's main strength is in highlighting: 
• the different components of the CMA's detriment calculation - the separation 
between the element that is due to pricing above costs (including a normal rate of 
return) and that which is due to alleged cost inefficiency; and 
• the extent to which the CMA seems to assume that a 'normally competitive' market 
would have flushed out the observed differences in costs between companies. 
 
Following the approach of this paper would obviously raise issues in relation to some of the 
pressures that UK regulators currently face.  The Littlechild logic is, in effect, that: 
 
1. The GB retail energy market has been characterised by relatively free entry on the 
supply side. 
2. To the extent that lack of engagement by some consumers with the market leaves 
these customers with demonstrably high tariffs, charged by incumbent suppliers, 
the customers involved are making a free choice and, hence, the price differences 
do not warrant regulatory intervention. 
 
This position does not mesh easily with the normative view that utility regulators should 






Markou, Eleni and Catherine Waddams Price (1999), 'UK Utilities: Past Reform and Current 
Proposals', Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. 
 
Relevance 
This paper is, in the main, a stocktake on where privatisation/regulation had reached in the 
run-up to the Utilities Act 2000.  As such, it covers all of the four dimensions of regulatory 
effectiveness in which the UKRN is interested. 
 
Summary 
The paper covers similar ground to some of the other papers on the UKRN list, although, it 
was written before several of the others.  In brief, it surveys the impact of 
privatisation/regulation on productivity, investment, quality of supply, average prices, the 
structure of prices and on distributional issues.  Like some of the other papers, it also seeks 
to disentangle what was due to privatisation itself, what was due to changes in market 
structure implemented as part of the privatisation process and what was due to subsequent 
regulation. 
 
The main conclusions are as follows: 
 
• Overall, labour productivity increased, although, as noted by others, some of the 
most rapid improvements were achieved in the run-up to privatisation.  
• Apart from for water, average prices eventually and broadly fell (after the increases 
entailed by the initial price controls). Average price falls occurred more in areas 
exposed to competition than in those just exposed to regulation, although, increased 
competition also triggered a rebalancing of prices, to the detriment of particular 
groups of consumers.  
• Regulators were increasingly drawn into quality issues.  One of the underlying 
themes of the paper is the increasingly elaborate specification of what companies 
had to deliver in return for regulated revenue (BT being a particularly egregious 
example of quality being left unspecified in the original flotation - subsequent 
privatisations did more in this area). 
• Regulators were increasingly drawn into scrutinising investment programmes, not 
least to enable regulators to separate genuine 'capital efficiencies' from artificially 
ambitious investment plans proposed at price reviews. 
• A general belief that the distribution of the gains of privatisation had been 
inequitable with too many gains going to shareholders and senior executives relative 
to consumers. This view underlay the planning for the Utilities Act 2000 which was 
occurring when the paper was written. 
• Overall, it is hard to disentangle the effects of privatisation from the effects of 
regulation and liberalisation/competition, although, average "costs and prices have 
fallen much faster where competition was introduced". 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
One of the strengths of the paper is how well its overall conclusions have held up over the 
twenty years since the paper was published.  One of the strongest underlying themes of the 
paper is the extent to which post-privatisation regulation has had to elaborate on the 
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'regulatory contracts' put in place at the time of privatisation.  Initially, this involved a more 
detailed articulation of what companies had to deliver in return for their regulated revenue 
and, in some cases, the introduction of penalties for a failure to deliver. More recently (and 
notably with Ofgem's RIIO framework), it has taken the form of a more complicated 





Nardotto, M., T. Valletti, F. Verboven (2015) “Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK 
broadband”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(2): 330-362. 
 
Relevance 
This paper is of particular relevance to consumer access and the quality of a key 
telecommunications product, namely broadband. 
 
Summary 
This paper combines datasets in a unique way to examine entry from Local Loop Unbundling 
(LLU) that permits entrants to use last mile facilities of incumbents, and ultimately to 
examine quality of service and competitive effects from cable presence. 
 
The researchers assemble quality data from users to calculate quality, adjusted for plan 
type, by local exchange. They find that in the initial period of LLU, broadband penetration 
increased substantially, however this impact did not continue in later years. Penetration was 
increased, including in the long-term, by cable competition with the telecom provider. This 
could suggest the benefits of LLU are outweighed, in the long-run, by the benefits of 
facilities-based competition. Having said this, the LLU competition did increase the quality of 
service, however, and the higher quality was entirely on the entrant lines.  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper performs a detailed analysis of the UK market and finds benefits from the 
existence of LLU regulation for speed, though not for penetration. Regulators could benefit 
from further work to compare the impacts. A cross-country approach would be particularly 
helpful for informing the debate about the appropriate regulatory approach to encourage 











NERA (2019), 'A comparison of the performance and efficiency of public- and privately-
owned energy networks', report commissioned by SSE. 
 
Relevance 
The paper is overwhelmingly about the impact of ownership - whether public or private - 




This paper is seeking to answer the question of whether privately owned energy networks 
deliver better performance than ones which are state-owned.  It does this through: (1) an 
examination of the performance of the privatised networks in the UK, (2) analysis of some 
general international evidence, and (3) case studies of Australia and Germany. These latter 
two countries are characterised by a mixture of publicly and privately owned networks and, 
in the case of Germany, by some re-municipalisation of hitherto privately operated 
networks. 
 
The report suggests that each set of evidence supports the case that privately owned 
networks perform better than publicly owned ones, whether in respect of operating costs, 
prices, levels of investment or quality/reliability of service. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper pulls together quite a bit of evidence from a variety of sources to support its 
central conclusions.  Nevertheless, two questions arise: 
 
• The paper suggests that the international data "indicates that effective 
independent regulation is central to ensuring that the private management of 
utilities results in positive outcomes for customers".  However, it is interesting that 
the Edwards and Waverman 2006 paper (reviewed here) suggests that, in the 
specific area of telecom interconnection rates, ownership makes little difference in 
the presence of independent regulation (this begs the question of whether it is 
easier to have independent regulation when the state is not conflicted by 
ownership of the regulated utilities in question).  Florio and Florio 2013 (reviewed 
below) suggests that, across the EU15 as a whole, it is public ownership which has 
been more effective in holding prices down to domestic consumers.  
• The conclusions on remunicipalisation in Germany are somewhat weaker than 
some of the other conclusions: "remunicipalisation has failed to achieve the 
anticipated improvements in price and performance" - possibly implying that the 
remunicipalised networks have at least held on to the efficiencies realised when 
they were in private hands.  The section on Germany also notes that "we find no 
discernible differences in service quality between predominantly privately and 
publicly-held companies". 
 
Overall, these two findings suggest two possible conclusions.  First, 
renationalisation might not necessarily lead to renationalised companies going 
backwards on performance, especially if supported by independent regulation.  
Second, the German evidence could be seen as consistent with the other papers 
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which downplay the role of ownership per se, relative to other factors like 





Parker, D. (2004) “The UK’s privatisation experiment: the passage of time permits a sober 
assessment.” CESifo Working Paper no. 1126. 
 
Relevance 
This research is particularly relevant to the question of the relationship between 
competition and regulation, as well as consumer impacts. 
 
Summary 
This paper examines the nationalisation experience of the UK, summarising studies that 
have examined performance changes in privatised companies in the UK and seeking to 
derive general conclusions from the assembled evidence. The paper broadly concludes that 
ownership in and of itself may not be key to economic performance, finding that the main 
impact of privatisation would come from first, increased competition and, failing that, good 
regulation. The conclusion is not that privatisation has no impact however. The paper notes 
that the preparation for privatisation and the subsequent reduced financial stake of 
government in the industry could both create more efficient production (particularly as 
companies improved their performance prior to privatisation) and that governments would 
then be less inclined to prevent competition in the privatised industries, due to the lower 
financial stake in the outcome for government enterprises that might have benefitted from 
monopoly. 
 
The paper focuses not only on the history of the financially most significant privatisations 
but also the broader history of de-nationalisation. Many of the privatisations did not involve 
public utilities and consequently did not involve subsequent regulation. For example, 
Rover’s sale to British Aerospace (after British Aerospace’s privatisation) is an example of a 
sale of a company that did not require regulation. 
 
The Telecommunications Bill that privatised British Telecom included the creation of a 
regulator OFTEL, after the Office of Fair Trading had suggested that regulating BT using pure 
competition law would encounter difficulty, in light of the need for specialist 
telecommunications knowledge and a high workload. 
 
Productive efficiency has been the most common focus of studies performed, with a 
preference for examining productivity and changes in cost of production, owing to the 
potential ambiguity in which profits can reflect higher prices or more efficient production. 
 
Seminal studies finding the importance of regulation and competition for generating good 
results from privatisation include Martin and Parker (1997), Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and 
Domah and Pollitt (2001) that find substantial gains in social welfare, with some skew of 
gains to producers and government (from higher tax revenues and lower subsidisation). 
Littlechild (2000) finds that the decline in prices for domestic customers was 26% in real 
terms between 1990 and 1999, while that for industrial and commercial customers was 25-
34 %. 
 
In the water industry, Shaoul (1997) found that prior to privatisation, there were significant 
efficiency gains. Saal and Parker (2000, 2001) suggest that “lax regulation at the outset plus 
a lack of competition combined to keep efficiency incentives weak in the early years.” 
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O’Mahoney (1998) compares productive levels between the UK and France, Germany, Japan 
and the US. She finds that productivity gaps narrowed, particularly in the late 1970s prior to 
privatisation. The main exception to the lowering of charges in privatised utilities was in 
water, in which real prices for water rose 40% in real terms for average unmetered bills, 
arguably necessary in order to fund large improvement programmes after “years of 
underinvestment by the state sector and to meet the requirements of EU water quality 
regulations.” 
 
The impacts on charges reported above are average results that may not emphasise 
differences for different groups, with the distribution of welfare gains in different groups 
addressed in Hancock and Waddams Price (1995), Waddams Price and Hancock (1998), 
Markou and Waddams Price (1999), Florio (2004) and Waddams Price and Young (2003). 
While state ownership was associated with uniform pricing and cross subsidies, privatisation 
would lead to prices more associated with marginal costs of serving different groups. UK 
regulators have generally accepted the need for removing the cross subsidies, to make price 
signals less distortive. The beneficiaries are often large customers, with lower marginal 
costs, who would receive larger reductions in price than poorer consumers who may be 
more costly to serve (NAO, 2001). “It has not proved possible for regulators to separate the 
pursuit of economic efficiency from the social consequences of their actions (Baldwin and 
Cave, 1999). Florio (2004) suggests that the public sector net wealth fell substantially after 
privatisation, due to under-pricing, and suggests this was not counter-balanced by the likely 
fiscal dividend from lower subsidies and taxes on profits.  
 
One key result of the privatisations has been regulation that improved and popularising of 
certain tools, “most notably the price cap” (Littlechild, 1983; Parker, 2002).    
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The wide-ranging review of research on privatisation focuses on the period that is perhaps 
most relevant for evaluating the possible productivity effects related to privatisation. The 








Parker, David (2009), 'Official History of Privatisation', Volume 1 Chapter 16 pages 438-440 
and Volume 2 Chapter 18. 
 
Relevance of the book excerpts 
These are excerpts from what is the official history of privatisation and, as of now, the 
standard work on the subject.  As regards the relevance to the question of the impact of the 
UK regulatory model, the excerpts relate to, in particular, the independence of regulators in 
the UK, the original core rationale for independent regulation in terms of underpinning 
investment in the privatised utilities and, perhaps less relevant to UKRN's specification, the 
overall impact of privatisation more generally on different aspects of the UK economy 
(although, in trying to assess the effectiveness of regulation, one needs to identify the 
extent to which effects are attributable to other factors, like ownership). 
 
Summary 
Pages 438-440 provide a very brief summary of various points about economic regulation in 
the early days of privatisation in the UK (Volume 1 covers the period up to 1987).  Key points 
in this summary are: 
• the core rationale for independent regulation "that continued regulation by 
Government department would deter investors".  This is a point which Parker had 
made much earlier in Volume 1, where he documents the impact of the influence of 
the advice of Kleinwort Benson (the Government's financial advisers) in relation to 
the flotation of BT; 
• the perceived success of Bryan Carsberg (at OFTEL) and James McKinnon (at OFGAS) 
in establishing the independence of their agencies; 
• the effect of privatisation in removing the conflict of interest between Government 
as owner and Government as regulator; 
• the judgement that it was unlikely that competition in telecoms and gas would have 
developed as quickly as it did if BT and BGC had stayed in state hands (and this 
judgement relates to a period where competition in the telecoms and gas industries 
had barely begun, when viewed from later). 
 
Noteworthy points in Chapter 16 of Volume 2 include: 
• the new duties on regulators imposed by the Labour Government (not least through 
the Utilities Act 2000); 
• a fairly nuanced assessment of the impact of privatisation: 
o clear impact on the pay of senior managers in the privatised utilities; 
o less clear impact on workers and on productivity, although acknowledgement 
that clear productivity improvements in some industries in the run-up to 
privatisation may well have been stimulated by the prospect of privatisation. 
 
This qualified assessment is summed up thus: "On balance, it seems fair to conclude that the 
strident claims of ministers during the 1980s and 1990s about the benefits of privatisation 
were exaggerated and the true picture is more of a mixed one." 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
Parker's book is primarily a work of history (and a much praised one), based on 
documentary evidence and interviews.  It is not, in the main, an economics book nor a 
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quantitative book (its assessments of the impact of privatisation are mainly high-level and 
qualitative).  It is largely about the process of privatisation, the decisions made and the 
reasons for those decisions.  However, one of the key points (the main reason why 
independent regulation was adopted, in the face of some opposition within Government) - 
i.e. the importance of independent regulation to investors - has obvious relevance to any 
continuing assessment of that model, at least as long as the industries in question remain in 









The report is focused on regulatory outcomes (in five areas).  As such it is highly relevant to 
the fundamental question posed of whether the UK regulatory model is producing desired 
outcomes.  In terms of the UKRN's particular focus, the RAND report focuses explicitly on 
five case studies which cover specific aspects of investment, competition and consumer 
protection. 
 
Somewhat reducing the relevance of the report is that Ofcom regulates a rapidly developing 
area.  The Rand report was published in 2012 and already feels quite dated. 
 
Summary 
The report covers Ofcom's performance in five areas: 
 
• Next Generation Access Networks (NGAN), i.e. fibre-based broadband access.  In 
this area, the report contrasts the UK's broadly market-led approach with the 
explicitly planned strategies followed by, for example, France and Sweden.  Overall, 
the report judges that the UK has not been disadvantaged by this approach, but the 
report also worries that the market-led approach may lead to a growing digital 
divide between urban and rural areas. This seems highly relevant given current 
concerns about whether regulation is working for particular groups of consumers, as 
well as for consumers on average. Although, since the report the UK government 
has put in place a subsidy regime for rural broadband. 
• Access via Local Loop Unbundling (LLU).  Rand notes that the UK was relatively late 
in enabling LLU but that late adoption has worked well in terms of both broadband 
penetration and price (and in terms of the number of providers taking advantage of 
LLU).  Rand worries more about the implications for longer term investment, not 
least in the context of reduced incentives to invest in infrastructure as a result of 
requiring third parties to be able to access that infrastructure. 
• Access to emergency services over voice-over internet protocol (VOIP).  Rand judges 
that Ofcom had performed well in planning for emergency access over VOIP and 
notes that its approach has been followed by the European Commission. 
• Spectrum planning for the 2012 Olympics.  The Olympics had not yet happened 
when the report was written but Rand comments that Ofcom has "learned where 
possible from previous Games" 
• Management of mobile mis-selling.  Rand judges that UK has done better than other 
countries and has successfully reduced the problem at a time when some other 
countries had not even accurately defined or measured the problem. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper's strength is that it focuses on five areas which were important for wholesale and 
retail consumers (and citizens) at the time that the report was written.  In terms of the areas 
of interest to UKRN, Ofcom clearly gets high marks at that time in areas like overall 





It also highlights some issues which are still important, including: 
 
• the question of whether a market-led approach will deliver for all consumers and 
not just for the generality of consumers - not least, the question of rural broadband 
and a digital divide between urban and rural areas (or even between different urban 
areas); 
• protection against mis-selling in a relatively cutthroat market like mobile. 
 
Against this, some things would seem to have moved on somewhat since the report was 
written.  For example: 
 
• facilities-based competition has become more important in broadband, at least in 
urban areas; 
• various Government policies have sought to increase investment in rural broadband.   
 
Probably the biggest single question posed by the report is whether a market-led approach 
will deliver for all consumers at a time when political and regulatory debate is becoming 
more focused on whether the current regulatory model work for particular groups of 
disadvantaged or vulnerable consumers, although, the report only considers this issue in 





Saal, D. and D. Parker (2001) “Productivity and price performance in the privatised water 




This paper is relevant to productivity and price in UK water and sewerage over different 
periods of regulation. 
 
Summary 
The paper examines productivity and pricing since the privatisation of UK water and 
sewerage. The paper finds that labour usage declined, yet total factor productivity growth, 
as estimated from quality-adjusted output indices, has not improved since privatisation.  
 
The paper further suggests that price performance indices have grown at higher rates than 
input costs. This is partly responsible for the increase in profits since privatisation. 
 
One reason hypothesised for the relatively poor performance after privatisation is the 
limited real competition that has occurred, even if benchmark competition has been 
important. 
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The question is whether to focus on rates of change (growth) or levels, as total factor 
productivity is estimated to have improved substantially in the regulated era. There is no 
default reason to expect growth or rates of change to continue as they have. For example, a 
company reorganisation may yield an immediate improvement in productivity, but there is 
no default reason to expect continual productivity improvements after the first benefits. So 
the focus on growth in the presentation of the results may be questioned, particularly since 
this focus leads to an assessment that might be different from that focusing on levels. 
 
Having said this, if technical progress is relatively continual, focusing on growth rates may be 
appropriate. 
 
Profits after privatisation were a necessary condition for private sector to make major 
investments in the water sector, which were indeed made, with investment levels having 
increased substantially after privatisation. The question of whether overall profits were too 
high to motivate the needed investment is one that is structurally difficult to answer but 






Tutton, T. (2019) “Political control of state-owned utilities in the UK” (mimeo) 
 
Relevance 




A key message of this paper is the continuing relevance of, and need for, independent 
bodies (called ‘regulators’ or something else) to sit between ministers and the utilities.  The 
paper focuses especially on the experience of nationalisation of network industries after 
WWII and through to the era of privatisation. 
 
The interesting point that arises is that the initial rules that led to running companies with 
boards that were populated by civic-minded people was not sufficient for generating all the 
needed technical and operational outcomes. 
 
As a result, regulators continue to have a role in a world of state-owned industries, as 
indeed they currently do with Scottish Water and with Network Rail. Intermediaries 
between politicians and public companies help to ensure good outcomes and State owned 
enterprise operating efficiency.  
 
Evaluation and other questions to address 
The paper is primarily based on review of literature, not data analysis. It would be valuable 
to gather data from the pre- and post-nationalisation period to further test the hypotheses.  
 
 
 
